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“Children Are People Too.” 
 Peter Newell1
“If you prick us, do we not bleed?  If you tickle us, do we 
not laugh?  If you poison us, do we not die”? 
 
 William Shakespeare2
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is not too late for modern constitutional law to catch up 
with antebellum abolitionists.  On the perennially 
controversial subject of child discipline, they were early 
advocates for less primitive and stinging ways of teaching 
minors what it means to be a proper human.  Indeed, “many 
abolitionists, loathing all forms of physical bondage and 
abuse of the powerless, also fought to end corporal 
punishment” of children.3
 
 1. PETER NEWELL, CHILDREN ARE PEOPLE TOO:  THE CASE AGAINST 
PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT (1989). 
  The abolitionist camp, revered for 
 2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 3, sc. 1. 
 3. Stephen Nissenbaum, Lighting the Freedom Tree, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 
1996, at A27; see also MYRA C. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL 
PUNISHMENT: PRISONERS, SAILORS, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN IN ANTEBELLUM 
AMERICA 39–40, 54, 57 (1984) (observing that opponents of slavery were often 
against corporal punishment of children as well); STEPHEN NISSENBAUM, THE 
BATTLE FOR CHRISTMAS 186–87 (1997) (noting that abolitionists generally 
abhorred corporal punishment); Sanderson Beck, Abolitionists, Emerson, and 
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its struggle against slavery, concurrently undertook the quest 
to liberate children from corporal punishment regardless of 
their race or whether they were owned or free.4  To 
abolitionists’ way of thinking, the two campaigns 
complemented each other.  While the relationship of corporal 
punishment of children to slavery may not be immediately 
obvious to a contemporary American, it required no great leap 
of logic for abolitionists to see the connection.  Just as they 
could not abide slave masters’ endemic use of corporal 
punishment on African-American “property,”5 less famously 
but just as surely, the abolitionists recoiled from adults’ use of 
corporal punishment on children.6
After the Civil War, the adoption of the Thirteenth 
Amendment
  In both contexts, the cause 
of the revulsion was the same, i.e., infliction of physical 
violence on people who had no choice but to submit. 
7 in 18658 signaled a huge victory for the 
abolitionists insofar as the Amendment’s Section 1 put an end 
to slavery as a legal institution in this country: “Neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall 
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.”9  The victory was made sweeter still by the 
potential for statutory reinforcement offered in the 
Amendment’s Section 2 endowing “Congress . . . [with] power 
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”10
The Amendment does not, of course, explicitly address 
the abolitionists’ parallel aim of banning corporal punishment 
 
 
Thoreau: Abolitionists and Garrison’s Nonresistance, http://www.san.beck.org/ 
GPJ16-Abolitionists.html#3 (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (mentioning that 
William Lloyd Garrison, a leading antebellum abolitionist, supported 
elimination of corporal punishment of children); MARGARET HOPE BACON, By 
Moral Force Alone: The Antislavery Women and Nonresistance, in THE 
ABOLITIONIST SISTERHOOD 275, 292 (Jean Fagan Yellin & John C. Van Horne 
eds., 1994) (chronicling abolitionist Lucretia Mott’s explanation of her position 
against all corporal punishment of children). 
 4. See Nissenbaum, supra note 3, at A27 (referring to children en masse as 
an object of the abolitionist crusade against legalized corporal punishment). 
 5. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 6. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 8. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO 
FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 218 (7th ed. 1994). 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. 
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of children.11  With the sunset of the abolitionist movement in 
1870,12 this issue mostly faded from civic consciousness13 even 
as the practice of corporally punishing children persisted with 
the legal system’s blessing.14  Indeed, both the praxis and the 
law’s approbation of it still endure, with some welcome, if 
fitful, modification.  Current statutory terminology may vary, 
but so-called reasonable parental corporal punishment of 
children is legal in all fifty states;15 and, “reasonable” corporal 
punishment of elementary and secondary schoolchildren 
remains legal under nineteen state laws16
 
 11. See supra notes 9 and 10. 
 (though in the 
 12. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: 
1863–1877 448 (1988) (recounting that the American Anti-Slavery Society 
disbanded in 1870 upon adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment forbidding 
federal and state race-based denials of the right to vote). 
 13. Susan H. Bitensky, Section 1983: Agent of Peace or Vehicle of Violence 
Against Children, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 335 (2001). 
 14. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Sturges, 2 A. 841 (Conn. 1885) (referencing the 
Encyclopedia of Education for the observation that there were numerous 
judicial decisions at that time favoring teachers’ prerogative to use corporal 
punishment on students, and that American law accorded parents the right to 
“correct his [sic] child.” Id. at 842); State v. Gillett, 9 N.W. 362 (Iowa 1881) 
(ruling that parents then had the legal power to administer corporal 
punishment to children within the family); Patterson v. Nutter, 7 A. 273 (Me. 
1886) (acknowledging teachers’ authority to administer corporal punishment to 
pupils); Heritage v. Dodge, 9 A. 722 (N.H. 1887) (referring to the right of 
teachers and parents to dispense corporal punishment to children); Quinn v. 
Nolan, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint (Ohio Super. 1879) (same); Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 
59 (1874) (noting that teachers may corporally punish schoolchildren); cf. COLIN 
HEYWOOD, A HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD: CHILDREN AND CHILDHOOD IN THE WEST 
FROM MEDIEVAL TO MODERN TIMES 100 (2001) (reporting that, throughout the 
nineteenth century, three-quarters of all children were corporally punished and 
that both fathers and mothers routinely whipped their progeny during this era). 
 15. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.3(a), at 536–37 (4th ed. 
2003); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-24(1) (2009); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.430(a)(1) 
(2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-403(1) (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-
703(1)(a) (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18(1) (2009); IND. CODE ANN.  
§ 31-34-1-15(1) (2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:18(4) (2009); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106(1), (4) (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.205(1) (2009); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 939.45(5)(b) (2009). 
 16. Because states employ disparate legal mechanisms to permit school 
corporal punishment, it is easier to be accurate by conversely listing those 
states that have banned such punishment.  ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4,  
§ 07.010(c) (2009); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49001 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.  
§ 53a-18(1), (6) (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 702 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT.  
§ 302A-1141 (2009); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-24 (2009); IOWA CODE § 280.21 
(2009); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-306(a) (2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37G 
(2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1312(3)-(4) (2009); MINN. STAT. § 121A.58 
(2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302 (3)-(4) (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-295 
(2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.4633 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-1 (2009); 
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N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 19.5 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-
02 (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.41(A) (2011); OR. REV. STAT.  
§ 339.250(12) (2009); 22 PA. CODE § 12.5 (2009); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 277-608-
2(B) (2009); VT. STAT. ANN tit. 16, § 1161a(b)-(c) (2007-2008); VA. CODE ANN.  
§ 22.1-279.1 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.300 (2009); W. VA. CODE  
§ 18A-5-1(e)(2009); WIS. STAT. § 118.31 (2009).  In addition, on April 6, 2011, the 
Governor of New Mexico signed a bill barring school corporal punishment in 
that state.  See Milan Simonich, NM Governor Signs Bill to Ban Paddling in 
Schools, EL PASO TIMES, Apr. 6, 2011, http://www.elpasotimes.com/ 
news/ci_17783884?source=rss. 
     Maine’s legislation is rather oblique on school corporal punishment inasmuch 
as the prohibition on the punishment is by negative inference.  ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 20, § 4009 (2009).  Subsection 1 of the statute grants teachers or other 
persons responsible for another person for “special or limited purposes” 
immunization from civil liability for “use of a reasonable degree of force against 
the person who creates a disturbance if the teacher or other person reasonably 
believes it is necessary to: A. Control the disturbing behavior; or B. Remove the 
person from the scene of the disturbance.”  The negative inference is that a 
teacher may use force, not to punish a student, but, rather, solely to handle a 
disturbance.  This is a correct interpretation of the statute as underscored by a 
Maine Department of Education statement advising that school personnel “no 
longer have the unilateral right to use corporal punishment to discipline 
students.”  ME. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCH. HEALTH MANUAL: ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
OF CHILDREN 2 (2006), http://www.maine.gov/education/sh/abuseneglect/ 
abuse06.pdf.  
     Rhode Island has no legislation forbidding corporal punishment of children 
in the schools.  The state’s Board of Regents for Elementary and Secondary 
Education has, however, promulgated regulations prohibiting the punishment 
in the public schools.  R.I. BD. OF REGENTS FOR ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
EDUC., PHYSICAL RESTRAINT REGULATIONS § 3.6 (2002), 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0C
DMQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ride.ri.gov%2Fregents%2FDocs%2FReg
entsRegulations%2FPHYS%2520REST%2520REGS%2520FINAL.pdf&ei=T5RT
UK6BLueRiALo1YA4&usg=AFQjCNH74OEqivqhABgHXKVa_RMcMCGm8g&s
ig2=MSVHWGq8QO7kInr2Uce6Tw.   
     South Dakota statutes on school corporal punishment are puzzling.  One 
asserts, in part, that “[s]uperintendents, principals, supervisors, and teachers 
and their aids and assistants, have the authority, to use the physical force that 
is reasonable and necessary for supervisory control over students.”  S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-2 (2009).  Another provides that a teacher or other 
school official may employ moderate, reasonable, and necessary force to restrain 
or correct a child.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-5 (2009).  Taken at face value, 
these enactments would not appear to place South Dakota in the antipaddling 
column.  The old bromide that warns against judging a book by its cover applies 
in this instance to the contents as well.  The South Dakota Deputy Attorney 
General and Counsel to the state’s Department of Education has previously 
acknowledged that the language of these statutes could be construed either to 
allow or outlaw school corporal punishment.  Telephone Interview with Craig 
Eichstadt, S.D. Deputy Attorney General and Counsel to the S.D. Dep’t of Educ. 
(June 17, 2004).  However, he related that whenever South Dakota school 
personnel have inquired as to his opinion about the legal status of school 
corporal punishment in that state, he has told them that the punishment is 
prohibited.  Id.  What has prompted him to do so is the legislative history of 
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latter jurisdictions many major metropolitan public school 
districts have exercised delegated authority to ban the 
practice anyway).17
Whether the corporal punishment of yore was meted out 
with a “birch” in the proverbial woodshed or whether it occurs 
today via a swift swat in the local supermarket, the 
punishment has always had the same essential 
characteristics.  The definition of corporal punishment of 
children which most accurately captures these characteristics 
is: the use of physical force upon a child’s body with the 
intention of causing the child to experience bodily pain so as 
 
 
Section 13-32-2.  The current statutory wording amends a former version which 
averred that school personnel had the ‘authority, to administer physical 
punishment on an insubordinate or disobedient student’ in order to maintain 
‘supervisory control over the student.’  Id.  The amendment notably deleted the 
phrase ‘physical punishment on an insubordinate or disobedient student,’ 
thereby implying that the physical force now permitted by the section may not 
be for punitive purposes.  Id. 
     However, the blue ribbon for most enigmatic state vis-à-vis illegality of 
school corporal punishment goes to New Hampshire.  Without a doubt, New 
Hampshire belongs in the abolitionist column, but the way it gets there is via a 
crazy quilt of policymaking.  The state’s relevant statute is abstruse.  See N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:6.II(a) (2011).  It provides that “[a] teacher . . . is justified 
on the premises in using necessary force against any . . . minor, when the minor 
creates a disturbance, or refuses to leave the premises or when it is necessary for 
the maintenance of discipline.”  Id. (emphasis added).  A reasonable lawyer 
might well conclude from the syntax that the statute authorizes school corporal 
punishment.  My research uncovered no New Hampshire clarifying rules or 
regulations.  Finally, and in some desperation, I had one of my research 
assistants call every single public school district in order to ascertain whether, 
as a policy matter, the individual schools or districts forbid corporal punishment 
of their students.  The answer is that there is no public school corporal 
punishment of children in New Hampshire; it is prohibited by separate policy 
decisions across the state.  Salam Elia, New Hampshire Calls July, 2011, at 1–
148 (setting forth a log of Ms. Elia’s telephone conversations with officials and 
employees in New Hampshire public schools and school district offices so as to 
cover the entire state and reflecting that school corporal punishment is not 
allowed in any of the state’s public elementary and secondary schools) (on file 
with author). 
     Incidentally, the District of Columbia also prohibits school corporal 
punishment.  D.C. MUN. REG. 5-E2403.2 (2002), available at 
http://www.dcregs.dc.gov/Gateway/FinalAdoptionHome.aspx?RuleVersionID=30
7604 (follow “5-E2403 Corporal Punishment,” then “View Text”). 
 17. For example, school districts which have prohibited corporal 
punishment of their students, that are located in states still permitting the 
punishment, include: Miami-Dade, Houston, Memphis, Austin, Fort Worth, 
Atlanta, San Antonio, Denver, Tuscon, and Dallas.  Discipline at School 
(NCACPS), CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE, http://www.stophitting.com/ 
index.php?page=100largest (last visited Oct. 23, 2012). 
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to correct or punish the child’s behavior.18
There are two important caveats to this definition.  By its 
very terms, the definition excludes physically restraining 
children to prevent them from imminently physically injuring 
themselves or others or from imminently damaging property.  
Physical restraint for these purposes is neither correction nor 
punishment; it is prevention.
  Any other 
circumstances that may attend a particular instance of 
corporally punishing a child, even if momentous to the actors 
involved, are superfluous as a definitional matter. 
19
The other caveat does not flow from the definition’s 
language, but, rather, is dictated by author’s fiat in order to 
appropriately limit the scope of this Article.  Specifically, the 
above-described definition of corporal punishment of children 
must be understood to exclude presently prosecutable 
physical child abuse.  There is admittedly a sense in which 
this exclusion is arbitrary because corporal punishment of 
children and prosecutable physical child abuse may be 
thought of as occupying discrete points on a single continuum 
of interpersonal violence.
 
20
 
 18. SUSAN H. BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN: A HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATION 2 (2006) [hereinafter BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT]; 
Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Susan H. Bitensky, The Case Against Corporal 
Punishment of Children: Converging Evidence from Social Science Research and 
International Human Rights Law and Implications for U.S. Public Policy, 13 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 231, 232 (2007).  
  However, physical child abuse 
typically is deemed more severe regarding the force or 
somatic damage inflicted, or is deemed to result from an 
abuser’s having a distinctive mental state beyond an intent 
 19. Susan H. Bitensky, The Poverty of Precedent for School Corporal 
Punishment’s Constitutionality Under the Eighth Amendment, 77 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1327, 1333 (2009). 
 20. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Independent Expert for the 
United Nations Study on Violence Against Children, ¶8, U.N. Doc. A/61/299 
(Aug. 29, 2006), available at http://www.unicef.org/violencestudy/ 
reports/SG_violencestudy_en.pdf (defining violence in two ways: (1) “all forms of 
physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, 
maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse” (quoting from the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 19, ¶1, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 
44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989)); and, (2) “the 
intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, 
another person, or a group or community, that either results or has a high 
likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or 
deprivation” (quoting from the WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON 
VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 5 (Etienne G. Krug et al. eds., 2002))). 
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merely to correct or punish behavior.21  Also, all American 
jurisdictions outlaw the various forms of physically abusing a 
child,22 while only some states outlaw corporally punishing a 
child some of the time.23  These differences affect the 
substance of the constitutional arguments against each 
phenomenon under the Thirteenth Amendment, making 
separate analytical treatment preferable.  The legal academy, 
moreover, has already taken up the issue of prosecutable 
physical child abuse as a Thirteenth Amendment violation,24
In any event, the continuing legality in the United States 
of so much corporal punishment of children has for some time 
conflicted with accumulating scientific evidence that the 
punishment is deleterious to children’s well-being
 
making its further consideration along those lines old news. 
25 and with 
deepening moral qualms.26  These contributions from science 
and ethics are principally contained in academic literature,27 
and are not widely known to the average policymaker or the 
man in the street.28  Ignorance, taken in tandem with many 
Americans’ religious or other traditions of disciplining 
children by the rod,29
 
 21. H.D. Warren, Criminal Liability for Excessive or Improper Punishment 
Inflicted on Child by Parent, Teacher, or One in Loco Parentis, 89 A.L.R.2d 396, 
§ 2 (2009). 
 may account for the lack of legal reform 
 22. The crime of physically abusing a child may be denominated differently 
by different states, but all states criminalize certain aspects of adult physical 
aggression against children.  ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, CHILD MALTREATMENT 
AND THE LAW: RETURNING TO FIRST PRINCIPLES 75 (2008); see Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman et al., Where and How to Draw the Line Between Reasonable 
Corporal Punishment and Abuse, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 114 (2010) 
(asserting that “child-abuse definitions typically appear” in state penal codes). 
 23. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
 24. E.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A 
Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1360 
(1992). 
 25. See BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 8–11. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. at 24. 
 28. Generally speaking, in the United States, scientific studies of and 
philosophical tracts on corporal punishment of children are not widely read 
beyond those members of the scholarly disciplines that produced them.  See 
generally Cornelia Dean, Scientific Savvy?  In U.S., Not Much, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
30, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/30/science/30profile.html (reporting 
political scientist’s findings that most Americans are illiterate in the sciences); 
MARTIN L. GROSS, THE CONSPIRACY OF IGNORANCE: THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 230–31 (1999) (discussing that even public school 
administrators are not offered courses on philosophy in graduate school). 
 29. PHILIP J. GREVEN, SPARE THE CHILD: THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF 
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regarding parental corporal punishment.  Even so, an 
intuition must be afloat that something is wrong about this 
form of punishment.  Otherwise, how is one to explain the 
fact that in 1977 only three states had outlawed school 
corporal punishment,30 but that now thirty-one states have 
done so?31  How is one to explain why most states currently 
bar this discipline in foster homes?32  And what else is one to 
make of polls showing that the more educated parents are, 
the less they approve of physically chastising children?33
There is, in short, a peculiar dissonance in twenty-first-
century America on the issue of corporal punishment of 
children.  We appear betwixt and between.  On the one hand, 
 
 
PUNISHMENT AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF PHYSICAL ABUSE 5–6, 74–75, 
93 (1991); IRWIN A. HYMAN, THE CASE AGAINST SPANKING: HOW TO DISCIPLINE 
YOUR CHILD WITHOUT HITTING 30, 38, 56–57, 204–05 (1997). 
 30. In Ingraham v. Wright, the Supreme Court asserted that as of 1977, 
only two states, New Jersey and Massachusetts, had prohibited school corporal 
punishment.  430 U.S. 651, 663 (1977).  The Court evidently overlooked the fact 
that by that year, Maine had done the same.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,  
§ 106 cmt 1975 (1975). 
 31. See Global Initiative to End All Corporate Punishment of Children, 
Global Progress, United States of America: CurrentLegality of Corporate 
Punishment: Schools, at http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/ 
pages.frame.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).  
 32. BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 288; see, e.g., ALA. 
ADMIN. CODE r. 660-5-29.04(2)(1)(iii) (2008); ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R6-5-
5909(E)(4)(e) (2008); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 84072(c)(15) (2009); CONN. 
AGENCIES REGS. § 17a-145-151(c) (2009); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 290-9-2.-
07(8)(c)(3)(ix) (2009); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, 402.21(c) (2009); IOWA ADMIN. 
CODE 441-114.20(237).(2) (2009); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 28-4-815(b)(1)(B) (2009); 
MD. HUM. RES. 07.05.02.09(C)(10)(a) (2009); 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.111(3) 
(2009); MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 400.1913(3)(a) (2009); MINN. R. 
2960.3080(8)(A)(1) (2009); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 13, § 35-60.050(5)(A) 
(2009); NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. tit. 390, ch. 11, § 002.01E (2009); N.H. CODE 
ADMIN. R. HE-C 4002.25(e)(2) (2009); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 122C-
3.1(a)(2)(iv) (2009); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10A, r. 70E.1101(a)(11) (2009); N.D. 
ADMIN. CODE § 33-03-24.1-01(1) (2009); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE 377:10-7-
3(d)(13)(A) (2009); OR. ADMIN. r. 414-205-0085(2)(a) (2009); OR. ADMIN. r. 413-
200-0358(1) (2009); 55 PA. CODE § 6500.33(a) (2009); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 40, 
§ 749.1953 (2009); UTAH ADMIN. r. 501-12-13(2) (2009); 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 
40-130-270(C)(4)(b)(7) (2009); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 170-296-0390(2) (2009); W. 
VA. CODE R. § 78-3-14.4.a.1 (2009); WISC. ADMIN. CODES DCF § 202.08(7)(b) 
(2009). 
 33. See ABC News Poll: Spanking Children, ABC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2002),  
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0C
CkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fabcnews.go.com%2Fimages%2FPollingUnit%2
F903a1Spanking.pdf&ei=kK1TUNuTCMmXigLjnoG4Aw&usg=AFQjCNEvUGiI
W-ETyKSIPjPylOaS1YGS1w&sig2=Np0hHo50S8TOkubHTXXTqA (finding that 
thirty-eight percent of parents with college degrees spank their children while 
fifty-five percent of less educated parents do so). 
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the law is moving on an incremental and slowly escalating 
trajectory of forbidding the punishment in settings beyond 
the family hearth;34 the movement in this direction is, 
wittingly or not, increasingly consistent with the expanding 
knowledge-base about the negative impacts of corporal 
punishment on its young recipients.35  On the other hand, 
state laws appear unbudgeable in their uniform commitment 
to allowing parental corporal punishment;36 and, this 
legislative lassitude, or perhaps obstinacy, runs entirely 
counter to the overwhelming weight of expert opinion 
condemning the punishment.37
Waiting for lawmakers to harmonize the dissonance on a 
state-by-state basis is not an optimal solution.  Such a 
piecemeal, haphazard approach would probably require a 
very long time before all children enjoyed complete legal 
protection from corporal punishment across the country.  In 
the meantime, the situation would continue to put children at 
risk, if they happened to reside in states resistant to this sort 
of change.
 
38  From the vantage point of the reform minded, 
then, it would be highly desirable if there was some 
paramount body of federal law prohibiting corporal 
punishment of children and trumping contrary state law.39
The Amendment is an ideal constitutional home for such 
a prohibition.  That much will be made clear by the 
conventional legal analysis, which is the pith and substance 
of this Article.
  
This is where the Thirteenth Amendment comes in. 
40
 
 34. See BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 289–90 
(summarizing that, except with respect to parental corporal punishment, the 
trend in the United States is toward outlawing corporal punishment of 
children). 
  But, it is worth remarking that the 
Amendment’s unique suitability for this protective role is also 
 35. See generally supra text accompanying note 27. 
 36. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 37. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
 38. See generally supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 39. As previously pointed out, there currently exist state laws, which, if they 
remain unchanged, would conflict with a new body of federal law outlawing all 
corporal punishment of children.  See generally statutes cited supra note 15 and 
accompanying text.  In the normal course, such federal law should take 
precedence over conflicting state law, under the preemption doctrine flowing 
from the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  See 2 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 12.1, at 269, § 12.4, at 292–94 (4th ed. 2007). 
 40. See infra Part I.  
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shaped by an America still seamed with the residue of 
nineteenth-century prejudice against Blacks.  One 
manifestation of these die-hard biases emerges in the racially 
skewed frequency with which corporal punishment is 
administered.  Corporal punishment has been a favored 
disciplinary tactic in African-American families, predicated 
on the myth of its effectiveness in keeping children out of 
trouble in tough neighborhoods.41  Perversely, the myth has 
roots in the oppression of slaves through lash and whip—a 
legacy that may have been internalized and passed on to 
slaves’ descendants.42  In addition, Black children are 
recipients of an inordinate amount of school corporal 
punishment.  Federal statistics show that, for the 2006–2007 
academic year, Black students comprised 17.1% of the 
national student population but received 35.6% of school 
paddlings.43
 
 41. See JANICE E. HALE-BENSON, BLACK CHILDREN: THEIR ROOTS, 
CULTURE, AND LEARNING STYLES 16, 125, 133, 147 (rev. ed. 1986) (reporting 
that research shows “that people . . . of the African diaspora tend to ‘whip’ their 
children more than Europeans,” and that African American culture has a 
proclivity toward using corporal punishment on children); JOYCE A. LADNER & 
THERESA FOY DIGERONIMO, LAUNCHING OUR BLACK CHILDREN FOR SUCCESS: A 
GUIDE FOR PARENTS OF KIDS FROM THREE TO EIGHTEEN 90–91 (2003) 
(observing that African American families have a culture of relying upon 
corporal punishment of children); C. André Christie-Mizell et al., Child 
Depressive Symptoms, Spanking, and Emotional Support: Differences Between 
African American and European American Youth, 57 FAM. REL. 335, 335 (2008) 
(mentioning that African American parents are more likely than European 
Americans to spank their children); Jennifer E. Lansford & Kenneth A. Dodge, 
Cultural Norms for Adult Corporal Punishment of Children and Societal Rates 
of Endorsement and Use of Violence, 8 PARENTING: SCI. & PRAC. 257, 258 (2008) 
(stating that corporal punishment of children is relatively normative within 
African American culture). 
  This means that Black students were corporally 
 42. See JAMES P. COMER & ALVIN F. POUSSAINT, RAISING BLACK CHILDREN: 
TWO LEADING PSYCHIATRISTS CONFRONT THE EDUCATIONAL, SOCIAL, AND 
EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS FACING BLACK CHILDREN 53 (1992) (commenting that 
historically, many Black parents felt that they had to resort to “severe 
punishment for even minor disobedience” of their progeny in order to protect the 
children from the harms which flow from living in harsh social conditions); 
LADNER & DIGERONIMO, supra note 41, at 90–91 (positing that the African 
American culture of using corporal punishment to discipline children stems 
from the history of corporal punishment of slaves); MARGUERITE A. WRIGHT, I’M 
CHOCOLATE, YOU’RE VANILLA: RAISING HEALTHY BLACK AND BIRACIAL 
CHILDREN IN A RACE-CONSCIOUS WORLD 130 (1998) (tracing the modern African 
American preference for corporal punishment of children, as a disciplinary tool, 
to the use of corporal punishment on slaves). 
 43. Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education, 2006 Civil Rights 
Data Collection, Projected Values for the Nation, 2006 National and State 
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punished at a rate that is almost twice their numbers in 
school, a form of racial discrimination writ large.44  Like the 
prevalence of corporal punishment of children in Black 
families, double doses of school paddling are probably another 
atavism of slavery; most of the states that currently permit 
school corporal punishment were also slave states before the 
Civil War.45
 
 
 
Projections, http://ocrdata.ed.gov/Projections_2006.aspx (click on “National 
Total.”) (last visited May 9, 2011); More Than 200,000 Kids Spanked at School, 
CNN (Aug. 20, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-08-
20/us/corporal.punishment_1_corporal-punishment-students-children-spanked-
us-schools?_s=PM:US.  This is the most recent federal data on corporal 
punishment of students. 
     It is interesting to note that there are more up-to-date federal statistics on 
racial disparities among students who are disciplined by expulsion and 
suspension.  See Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Civil Rights Data 
Collection (March 2012), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/ 
list/ocr/docs/crdc-2012-data-summary.pdf (reporting that although African-
American students represent eighteen percent of the student population used in 
the study sample, they constituted thirty-five percent of students suspended 
once, forty-six percent of those suspended more than once, and thirty-nine 
percent of those expelled). 
 44. See Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The 
Creation of the Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 470 (1999) 
(referring to modern race discrimination as the legacy of slavery); cf. Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442–43 (1968) (noting that “when racial 
discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property 
turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery”); HOWARD ZINN, A 
PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1492–PRESENT 435 (rev. and updated 
ed. 1995) (highlighting the memory and “living presence” of slavery as “part of 
the daily lives of blacks in generation after generation”). 
 45. There were fifteen slave states, including the “semi-slave states” of 
Maryland and Delaware.  HENRY CHASE, THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH: A 
STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE CONDITION OF THE FREE AND SLAVE STATE, at v, 7 
(2005).  The other thirteen slave states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.  Id. at 7.  State laws expressly 
allowing use of corporal punishment in public elementary and secondary schools 
include Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee; and state laws that are silent on the 
issue, presumably indicating tolerance of the practice, include Alabama and 
Mississippi.  Discipline and the Law: State Laws, THE CTR FOR EFFECTIVE 
DISCIPLINE, http://www.stophitting.com/index.php?page=legalinformation 
#granting (Jul. 2009).  Thus, of the fifteen former slave states, twelve allow 
school corporal punishment out of the total of nineteen states that presently do 
so.  I would like to thank Professor Deana Pollard Sacks for alerting me to this 
alignment.  Interview with Deana Pollard Sacks, Professor of Law, Texas 
Southern University Thurgood Marshall School of Law, in Dallas, Tex. (June 2, 
2011). 
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These statistics, it should be emphasized, are not offered 
to suggest giving only Black children a refuge from corporal 
punishment under the Thirteenth Amendment.  Such 
exclusivity would be unfair to children of other races and 
would undoubtedly raise equal protection problems.46
Part I of this Article advances the argument that the 
Amendment’s first section should be interpreted to implicitly 
prohibit all corporal punishment of all children in the United 
States, regardless of the punishment’s relative mildness or 
severity, the identity of the punisher or of the child victim, or 
the venue where the punishment is meted out.  The argument 
turns, in large measure, on making the case that corporal 
punishment reduces the child, at least for the duration of the 
punishment, to a condition extraordinarily similar to the 
conditions suffered by antebellum slaves, such similarity 
being a constitutional marker of enslavement.
  The 
statistics instead are marshaled to demonstrate that, as 
presently practiced, corporal punishment of children falls 
disproportionately on small black and brown bodies in an 
ugly throwback to slavery’s heyday; thus, in 
deconstitutionalizing corporal punishment of all minors, the 
Thirteenth Amendment would coincidentally but importantly 
contribute to ameliorating a legacy of racism that intrudes 
upon children’s lives in particular. 
47
 
 46. The equal protection principle arises from two clauses of the 
Constitution.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
enunciates: “[N]or [shall any state] deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause has been interpreted to implicitly interpose 
the same protection as against the federal government.  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497, 498–500 (1954).  The express words of that Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause are that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  If states or the federal 
government were to enact statutes banning solely de jure corporal punishment 
of Black children in the public schools, then the statutes would be subject to 
strict scrutiny in the face of an equal protection challenge; the rationale for 
applying strict scrutiny would be that the statutes discriminate on the basis of 
race, a suspect class.  Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999); Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
  This part 
also explores opportunities for practical application of an 
implied prohibition, such as by relying upon the popular 
assimilation of the prohibition’s pedagogical message or by 
seeking prospective injunctive intervention or retrospective 
 47. See infra Part I.A. 
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judicial redress vis-à-vis violations of the prohibition. 
Part II of the Article contends, concomitantly or 
alternatively, that Congress is empowered under the 
Amendment’s second section to legislate a ban on corporal 
punishment of children.  This contention is supported by 
either one of two theories.  First, inasmuch as Part I 
establishes that corporal punishment of children is a 
permutation of unconstitutional slavery, there is warrant for 
Congress to enact a statute against the punishment just as it 
could against slavery.48  The second theory is that, because 
there is historical data chronicling that corporal punishment 
was an ordinary part of the way slave masters treated slaves, 
the punishment is a badge and incident of slavery within 
Congress’ reach.49
I. THESIS UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 
  This part furthermore sets forth 
compelling policy reasons for Congress to enact this type of 
abolitionist (in both senses of the word) statute as a priority. 
A. Section 1’s Prohibition of Slavery Should be Interpreted to 
Implicitly Prohibit Corporal Punishment of Children 
1. Slavery’s Definition and Dramatis Personae 
The Thirteenth Amendment’s first section explicitly bars 
slavery and involuntary servitude.50
a. The Precedent-Based Definition 
  Since a central thesis of 
this Article is that corporal punishment of children is closely 
akin to slavery and consequently violates Section 1’s bar on 
the latter, a threshold question interposes as to what slavery 
actually is under the Amendment. 
There is a dearth of U.S. Supreme Court rulings or even 
dicta defining the term “slavery” under Section 1 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.51
 
 48. See infra Part II.A. 
  The Court’s few ruminations on 
 49. See infra Part II.A. 
 50. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 51. There are, by my count, only four cases in which the Supreme Court 
made a fresh stab each time at defining slavery.  See infra notes 55, 56, 59 and 
accompanying text; cf. Marco Masoni, Student Research, The Green Badge of 
Slavery, 2 GEO J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 97, 104 (1994) (noting that it is still 
hard to reach a consensus on the meaning of “slavery” under the Thirteenth 
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the subject during the nineteenth century were, at best, 
vague and impressionistic.52  The majority opinion in the 
Civil Rights Cases53 is paradigmatic.  There, the Court 
trumpeted Section 1’s abolition of slavery as an epic 
breakthrough “establish[][ing] universal freedom.”54  What 
may be more salient than any other aspect of this 
contribution is its emotional vibrance.  The statement, in 
spite of its brevity, appears freighted with judicial aspirations 
to imbue the Amendment’s interdiction with a humanizing 
elasticity and capaciousness.  The phraseology, also reiterated 
in some late twentieth-century Supreme Court decisions,55
Of course, the equation of slavery’s prohibition to 
“universal freedom” is maddeningly opaque if one is bent on 
chasing down slavery’s constitutive components.  Perhaps the 
closest the Court ever came during this early period to 
specifying some of those components was, ironically, in Plessy 
v. Ferguson,
 
has evidently continued to resonate with an extended 
succession of Justices. 
56
 
Amendment); Benjamin P. Quest, Comment, Process Theory and Emerging 
Thirteenth Amendment Jurisprudence: The Case of Agricultural Guestworkers, 
41 U.S.F. L. REV. 233, 236 (2006) (averring that “it is far from clear” what 
“slavery” means). 
 which acclaimed the now unconstitutional 
 52. See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.  
 53. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 54. Id. at 20. 
 55. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125 (1981); Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968). 
 56. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896).  Plessy is no longer good 
law, but the way in which that happened is subject to some dispute.  
Occasionally, commentators have assumed that Plessy was overruled by Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  E.g., Sharon K. Russo, Vouchers for 
Religious Schools: The Death of Public Education?, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
49, 49 (2003).  From a technical perspective, Brown did not go that far.  Akhil 
Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 
66 (2000); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that 
Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1914 n.74 (2004).  Under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Brown did repudiate 
Plessy’s separate-but-equal doctrine, but only insofar as it applied to de jure 
racial segregation of students in public elementary and secondary schools.  
Plessy was instead overruled, post-Brown and sub silentio, in a series of 
Supreme Court decisions invalidating under the Clause various racially 
“separate-but-equal,” governmentally imposed arrangements in other contexts.  
William W. Van Alstyne, Discrimination in State University Housing 
Programs—Policy and Constitutional Consideration, 13 STAN. L. REV. 60, 62 n.9 
(1960); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural 
Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 323 n.136 (1986). 
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separate-but-equal doctrine.57  In Plessy, the Court catalogued 
four constitutive components of slavery or involuntary 
servitude: bondage, ownership of a human being as chattel, 
control of another person’s labor, and deprivation of a 
person’s right to dispose of his or her own property, services, 
or self.58
It was not until 1988 in United States v. Kozminski
  However, inasmuch as the Court neglected to 
specify which components belonged to which of the two 
concepts or whether all of the components belonged to both 
concepts (i.e. slavery or involuntary servitude), this, the 
Court’s first attempt at reductionist analysis, was stillborn 
and has been of little use. 
59 that 
the Supreme Court finally pinned down one indicator of what 
slavery is.60  The case arose out of charges of perpetrating 
involuntary servitude, brought against the Kozminskis under 
two federal statutes.61  Because the meaning of “involuntary 
servitude” under the statutes depended on the terminology’s 
meaning under the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court ended 
up focusing on an interpretation of the latter.62
The Court’s rendering of “involuntary servitude,” from an 
analytical standpoint, is straightforward.  The Justices were 
guided by original intent.
 
63  They deduced that, in forbidding 
involuntary servitude, the Amendment’s framers must have 
intended to ban compulsory labor where the compulsion is 
achieved by use of physical coercion.64
 
 57. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542.  See supra note 56 with respect to the 
undoing of Plessy’s separate-but-equal doctrine. 
  Employing other 
 58. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542. 
 59. U.S. v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988). 
 60. See infra text accompanying note 75. 
 61. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934. 
 62. Id. at 941, 944–45.  As mentioned in the text above, the Kozminskis 
were alleged to have committed involuntary servitude in contravention of two 
federal statutes.  The Court found itself in the position of construing the phrase 
“involuntary servitude” of Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment due to 
certain peculiarities in those statutes.  One statute did no more than 
criminalize violations of unspecified federal constitutional rights, thereby 
necessitating that the Kozminski Court elucidate the right embraced by 
“involuntary servitude” in the Amendment.  The other statute expressly 
criminalized “involuntary servitude;” but, because the provision resulted from 
congressional intent to criminalize the same conduct proscribed by that phrase 
in the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court was again faced with interpreting the 
latter.  Id.  
 63. Id. at 942. 
 64. Id. 
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heuristic methodologies, the Court also held that such 
compulsion could be achieved by legal coercion or even by the 
threat of physical or legal coercion.65  The Court thus, in one 
fell swoop, introduced compulsory labor and physical or legal 
coercion or threat of either one, as constitutive elements of 
involuntary servitude under the Amendment.66
Of these types of coercion, only physical coercion is 
capable of analogy to corporal punishment of children.  Both 
are acts inflicting physical force upon another person to exact 
his or her compliance with the force-wielding party’s 
demands.  Neither legal coercion nor the threat of physical or 
legal coercion share with corporal punishment of children 
such a preeminently defining feature beyond the generality of 
coerciveness—a generality so broad as to be of negligible 
analytical interest here.  It is therefore only Kozminski’s 
reference to physical coercion that is pertinent to this Article.  
All of which is to explain why the ensuing discussion, in an 
effort to avoid verbal and ideational clutter, often dispenses 
with mentioning the other three types of coercion expressive 
of involuntary servitude. 
 
The Kozminski majority opinion, unpacked this far, 
contains no mention of slavery.  This makes sense since the 
merits of the Kozminski suit were contingent on whether the 
respondents had committed involuntary servitude,67 and 
since the Justices were invoking evidence of original intent 
directed at parsing that phrase.  The majority opinion goes 
on, however, to shore up the parsing with an etiological 
search for the provenance, beyond originalism, of physical 
coercion as a constitutive element of involuntary servitude.68  
This manner of proceeding is, it happens, fortuitous for 
purposes of arguing that corporal punishment of children is 
congruent with enslavement and therefore within the 
Constitution’s proscription of slavery.  Indeed, it is that 
etiological endeavor which caused the Kozminski Court 
inexorably to back its way into construing the Amendment’s 
indictment of slavery.69
 
 
 
 65. Id. at 942–44. 
 66. See id. at 934. 
 67. Id. at 942. 
 68. See id. at 938–39; see infra text accompanying notes 70–7.  
 69. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942. 
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The Court commenced rearward maneuvers with the 
statement that the “primary purpose of the [Thirteenth] 
Amendment was to abolish the institution of African slavery 
as it had existed in the United States at the time of the Civil 
War,”70 though the Court carefully averred the Amendment 
was not limited to that purpose.71  The Court pursued this 
caveat by descrying two additional purposes of the 
Amendment implicitly arising from its prohibition on 
involuntary servitude.  The first additional purpose is that of 
interdicting “ ‘those forms of compulsory labor akin to African 
slavery’ ” 72 and the second additional purpose is that of 
interdicting “conditions ‘akin to African slavery.’ ” 73
It is the Court’s deduction from these additional purposes 
that shines an epiphanic light on slavery’s crux and core.  The 
Court expounded that “from the general intent [of the 
Amendment’s ban on involuntary servitude] to prohibit 
conditions ‘akin to African slavery,’ . . . we readily can deduce 
an intent to prohibit compulsion through physical coercion.”
 
74
Kozminski’s holding yields the definitional nugget that 
slavery, whatever else it may be, must entail the use of 
physical coercion.
  
While left unsaid, an obvious and ineluctable inference from 
that proposition is that African slavery itself must have 
involved physical coercion as a constant; otherwise, conditions 
akin to slavery could not involve such coercion. 
75
 
 70. Id. 
  The definition is part and parcel of the 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916)). 
 73. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Butler, 240 U.S. at 332); see Seth F. 
Kreimer, Rejecting “Uncontrolled Authority Over the Body”: The Decencies of 
Civilized Conduct, The Past and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 423, 425 n.8 (2007) (quoting the passage in Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 
942, in which “compulsory labor” is deleted). 
     In the interest of thoroughness, it should be mentioned that the Court 
confronted an epic impediment to asserting the second implied purpose (of 
interdicting conditions like African slavery) since there was no precedent to 
support it.  While Kozminski quoted verbatim from Butler, 240 U.S. at 332, to 
give valid backing for the first implied purpose, it invoked Butler in aid of the 
second purpose as well, though Butler is devoid of any reference to “conditions” 
akin to African slavery.  See id. passim. 
 74. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942 (citation omitted).  
 75. Id. at 953.  Other commentators, without providing a supporting 
analysis, have nonetheless opined that Kozminski makes physical coercion an 
inherent component of slavery.  See, e.g., Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 
1369, 1379–80 (quoting and referring to those passages from Kozminski making 
physical coercion key to slavery and involuntary servitude); cf. Kurt Mundorff, 
1_BITENSKY FINAL.doc 7/1/2013  1:59 PM 
2013]        AN ANALYTICAL ODE TO PERSONHOOD 19 
holding because, as shown above, the case’s resolution pivoted 
on the meaning of “involuntary servitude,” which, in turn, 
relied on the meaning of “slavery;” and, the Court 
abstemiously defined elements of “slavery” only insofar as 
was pertinent to such resolution.76
The contours of Kozminski’s holding go a long way to 
explain a rendering of “slavery” that is as spare as it is 
seminal.  The Court did not even pause in the rendering long 
enough to meditate upon slavery’s other possible 
dimensions—especially that of one person holding title to 
another.
  Though no fanfare 
attended the demiurgic moment, it was thus that Kozminski 
created the sole precedent-based definition of “slavery” under 
Section 1. 
77  The Court’s omission in this regard is somewhat 
jarring since conventional wisdom is mostly preoccupied with 
the technicality of ownership as slavery’s sine qua non.78  The 
Court’s disinterest in title, and focus instead on physical 
coercion, while surely a function of supporting the holding on 
involuntary servitude, may also have been a sage and 
farseeing move.  For, the Court’s reticence has avoided the 
danger of straightjacketing the Section 1 definition of slavery 
in ways that could unduly constrict its ongoing relevance.  
The Kozminski Court confessed as much when it articulated a 
willingness, in an appropriate suit, to hold that slavery exists 
in a factual situation where there is no outright ownership 
involved.79
 
Note, Children as Chattel: Invoking the Thirteenth Amendment to Reform Child 
Welfare, 1 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 131, 166 (2003) (observing that 
the Kozminski “ ‘physical or legal coercion’ ”  standard governs slavery and 
involuntary servitude). 
 
 76. See supra notes 62–75 and accompanying text. 
 77. Kozminski, 487 U.S. passim. 
 78. See Slavery Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com 
/browse/slavery (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (stating that “SLAVERY emphasizes 
the idea of complete ownership and control by a master: to be sold into slavery”); 
Slavery, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/ 
EBchecked/topic/548305/slavery (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (explaining that 
“slavery” is a “condition in which one human being was owned by another”).  I 
refer to a dictionary and encyclopedia for definitions of “slavery” as sources 
which lay persons would most likely consult.  Thus, these are the sources that 
would be instrumental in helping to engender conventional wisdom. 
 79. See, e.g., Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942 (averring that Section 1 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment bars conditions akin to antebellum slavery); Kathleen 
A. McKee, Modern-Day Slavery: Framing Effective Solutions for an Age-Old 
Problem, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 141, 152 n.73 (2005) (describing the Thirteenth 
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The resistance to straightjacketing “slavery” has a 
plaguey downside, though.  Due to its skimpiness, the 
Kozminski definition leaves the impression that it could be 
merely one part of an unfinished judicial work in progress.  If 
so, that raises the question of how one should employ the 
definition when engaging in legal analysis under Section 1.  
The options are to refrain from such analysis altogether or to 
work with the definition thus far provided.  The former 
approach would cut short the prohibition’s doctrinal 
development and any further application by the courts.  
Inasmuch as an ossified, if not moribund, Thirteenth 
Amendment would be outside the constitutional or moral 
pale, jurists must make do with the Kozminski definition as 
is. 
Yet, whether the precedent-based definition of slavery is 
partial or complete, and though it is of Spartan temper, this 
is one of those instances where less is also more.  The Justices 
hit upon a definition that is doctrinally sound because it is 
based on the reality of slave life.  That is, the Kozminski 
definition encapsulates the most essential attribute of slavery 
as it existed in the American South, i.e., master-on-slave 
coercive physical violence.80  The fact is that it was de rigeur 
for antebellum slaveholders and their henchmen to physically 
coerce slaves, with the endorsement of state law.81
 
Amendment as prohibiting not only slavery, but also “systems akin thereto, in 
which one person possesses virtually unlimited authority over another” (quoting 
Howard Devon Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 10 NAT’L B.J. 7, 7 (1952)); Neal Kumar Katyal, Note, Men Who 
Own Women: A Thirteenth Amendment Critique of Forced Prostitution, 103 
YALE L.J. 791, 792, 796, 806–13 (1993); Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights 
Approach: Achieving Revolutionary Abolitionism Through the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1773, 1845–46 (2006) (asserting that the 
Thirteenth Amendment forbids “full-blown slavery as well as conduct depriving 
individuals of the fundamental rights that catalyzed the American Revolution”). 
  Among 
 80. See supra text accompanying note 74.  But see PETER KOLCHIN, 
AMERICAN SLAVERY 1619–1877 5 (1993) (arguing that the type of slavery which 
materialized in the “European-derived” world during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries was “preeminently a system of labor”). 
 81. See Everette Swinney, Suppressing the Ku Klux Klan: The Enforcement 
of the Reconstruction Amendments 1870–1877, in AMERICAN LEGAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: A GARLAND SERIES OF OUTSTANDING 
DISSERTATIONS 36–37 (Harold Hyman & Stuart Bruchey eds., 1987); FONER, 
supra note 12, at 78; HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., CLASSIC SLAVE NARRATIVES 497, 
520 (1987); cf. JAMES OLIVER HORTON & LOIS E. HORTON, SLAVERY AND THE 
MAKING OF AMERICA 11 (2005) (contributing that “[s]lavery was a coercive 
system sustained by the mobilization of the entire society, and its maintenance 
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the violent techniques in their disciplinary repertoire, 
slaveholders exhibited a pronounced partiality to hitting, 
whipping, and flogging.82  It was no aberration that Dred 
Scott v. Sandford,83 infamously holding in 1856 that slaves’ 
descendants were property,84 arose from a White man’s 
ferocious whipping of Dred Scott and his wife and daughters, 
an African-American family.85  So routine and unrelenting 
was the legalized violence that, upon emancipation, former 
slaves were heard to conceptualize their freedom as “abolition 
of punishment by the lash.”86
As the whipping of Dred Scott’s daughters underscores, 
children were not spared the white man’s lash by reason of 
their minority.  It appears that masters not only saw physical 
coercion as the go-to expedient for “breaking in” children to 
slavery’s demands, but also as a general nostrum for the 
annoyances and mischief posed by rambunctious youth, 
whether enslaved or not.
 
87
 
rested on the use of unimaginable violence and the constant threat of violence”).  
For additional descriptions of the pervasive flogging of antebellum slaves, see 
JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE 
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 251 (rev. and enlarged ed. 1979); FREDERICK DOUGLASS, 
LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 52, 121 (Collier Books, reprinted from 
the rev. ed. 1962) (1892). 
  A sometime denizen of Georgia, 
the Reverend Horace Moulton bore witness to the regularity 
 82. See FONER, supra note 12, at 78; Swinney, supra note 81, at 37. 
 83. 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendments, U.S. 
CONST. amends. XIII, § 1, XIV, § 1 (the Citizenship Clause). 
 84. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 411, 426–27, 454. 
 85. See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Dred Scott’s Daughters: 
Nineteenth Century Urban Girls at the Intersection of Race and Patriarchy, 48 
BUFF. L. REV. 669, 686 (2000). 
 86. FONER, supra note 12, at 78. 
 87. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. 106th Cong., 2d Sess., at E2106 (Nov. 14, 2000) 
(averring that whipping slaves, including children, was omnipresent in the 
South); BELINDA HURMENCE, SLAVERY TIME, WHEN I WAS CHILLUN 9 (1997) 
(setting forth slave Fannie Moore’s recollection of a childhood beating dispensed 
by her master); WILMA KING, STOLEN CHILDHOOD: SLAVE YOUTH IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 20, 29, 215, 217 (Darlene Hine Clark et al. 
eds., 2d. ed. 2011) (recounting various episodes of slave masters whipping slave 
children); Orville Vernon Burton, Edgefield, South Carolina: Home to Dave the 
Potter, in I MADE THIS JAR . . . THE LIFE AND WORKS OF THE ENSLAVED 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN POTTER, DAVE 39, 46 (Jill Beute Koverman ed., 1998) 
(remarking upon slave masters’ standard practice of whipping slave children); 
Calvin Schermerhorn, Left Behind but Getting Ahead: Antebellum Slavery’s 
Orphans in the Chesapeake, 1820–60, in CHILDREN IN SLAVERY THROUGH THE 
AGES 204, 208–09 (Gwyn Campbell et al. eds., 2009) (providing a slave child’s 
description of being flogged). 
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of the phenomenon in 1839, observing that slave “[c]hildren 
are whipped unmercifully for the smallest offences.”88
The other side of the coin was that, while slaves writhed, 
cowered, or mentally shook their fists at the unceasing 
assaults, many slaveholders and their progeny became 
conditioned to thrashing slaves.  As the Kentucky slave Lewis 
Clarke acidly described it, “from the time [slaveholders’ White 
children] are born till they die, they live by whipping and 
abusing the slave.”
 
89  It is telling that, even once the 
Confederacy was defeated, White corporal punishment of 
Blacks in the South still remained a “habit so inveterate with 
a great many persons as to render, on the least provocation, 
the impulse to whip a negro almost irresistible.”90
The substantive richness of Kozminski’s definition of 
slavery, however, is not only a historical truth; it is what 
constitutionally should be.  It must be kept in mind that 
Kozminski’s definition was devised within the context of a 
related legal history, i.e., the Court’s early musings on slavery 
as freedom’s antithesis.
 
91  There is no reason why these 
musings, partaking as they do of the ardor that gained formal 
expression in the Thirteenth Amendment’s interdiction,92
In sum, the Supreme Court has defined the “slavery” 
prohibited by Section 1 as the use of physical force by one 
person on another
 
should now be ignored.  To the contrary, they are a reminder 
of the whys and wherefores of the Amendment that should 
likewise animate Kozminski’s formulation with a continuing 
sense of liberated human possibility. 
93
 
 88. Rev. Horace Moulton, Narrative and Testimony of Rev. Horace Moulton, 
in INTERESTING MEMOIRS AND DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AMERICAN SLAVERY, 
AND THE GLORIOUS STRUGGLE NOW MAKING FOR COMPLETE EMANCIPATION 
123, 133 (1846) [hereinafter AMERICAN SLAVERY]. 
—a prohibition that rightly should be 
infused with the Amendment’s expansive spirit.  This is the 
sole definition with full precedential weight.  It is therefore 
the only definition of “slavery” appropriate for use in 
constitutional analysis. 
 89. Lewis Clarke, Questions and Answers, in AMERICAN SLAVERY, supra 
note 88, at 79, 94. 
 90. 1 Carl Schurz, Report on the Condition of the South, in SPEECHES, 
CORRESPONDENCE AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF CARL SCHURZ 279, 316 (Frederic 
Bancroft ed., 1913). 
 91. U.S. v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988).  
 92. See generally supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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b. Endogenous Attributes of the Precedent-Based 
Definition 
The Kozminski definition of slavery as one person’s use of 
physical coercion against another automatically declares the 
presence of at least two other connate secondary attributes.  
Given that disposition of the Kozminski case depended only 
on interpreting “involuntary servitude,” the Court had no 
need to and did not mention slavery’s secondary attributes.94  
Nonetheless, the definition would collapse without them.95
The first of these attributes is that the coercing party 
must be enabled, by law or otherwise, to engage in the 
physical coercion.  It is elementary logic that unless such 
empowerment exists, no physical coercion can exist either.  
The second attribute is that the exercise of physical coercion 
causes, immediately and immanently, the coerced party to 
undergo “domination, degradation and subservience, in which 
human beings are treated as chattel, not persons.”
  
96  There is 
abundant evidence from antebellum history supporting this 
proposition.  The annals show that domination and 
degradation were ever these slaves’ lot—or they were no 
slaves.97  American slave narratives are filled to overflowing 
with despairing accounts of this erosion of dignity and self.98
 
 94. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. passim. 
 
 95. See infra text accompanying note 101. 
 96. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1365; see Hodges v. United States, 
203 U.S. 1, 8 (1906) (referring to a Webster’s dictionary definition of “slavery” as 
“the state of entire subjection of one person to the will of another”), overruled in 
part by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968); Shima 
Baradaran-Robison, Notes & Comments, Tipping the Balance in Favor of 
Justice: Due Process and the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments in Child 
Removal from Battered Mothers, BYU L. REV. 227, 247–48 (2003) (noting that 
degradation, subjugation, and domination are evils suffered by the enslaved). 
 97. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD 179 (2006) (noting the dehumanization of 
American slaves); WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT 
BATTLE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 12 (1996) (referring to southern 
masters’ subordination of and disdain toward slaves); ORLANDO PATTERSON, 
SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 38, 95 (1982) (depicting 
slaves as virtual nonbeings due to the “social death” precipitated by 
enslavement). 
 98. E.g., Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an 
American Slave (1845), reprinted in NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK 
DOUGLASS, AN AMERICAN SLAVE & INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL 1, 
28 (2000) (telling of the dehumanizing character of slavery and its “soul-killing” 
effects); Harriet Jacobs (writing under the pen name of Linda Brent), Incidents 
in the Life of a Slave Girl, in THE CLASSIC SLAVE NARRATIVES 437, 498 (Henry 
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While the immanence of these two secondary attributes 
in the Kozminski formulation of slavery as physical coercion 
may be of interest in and of itself, the analysis yielding them 
is provided in furtherance of this Article’s agenda of fleshing 
out the most complete definition of slavery that is still 
precedent-based.  Predicated on Kozminski’s particularized 
formulation and combined with the foregoing distillation of 
its immanent secondary attributes, a simple syllogism reveals 
the coalescing of that complete definition, as follows: 
(i)  Kozminski defines slavery as one person’s use of 
physical coercion on another;99
(ii)  That definition of slavery is part of Kozminski’s 
holding;
 
100
(iii)  Two endogenous secondary attributes of that 
definition consist of empowerment to physically coerce as well 
as domination and degradation of the coerced person;
 and 
101
(iv)  Therefore, the secondary attributes are part of 
Kozminski’s holding and possess its precedential value. 
 
The syllogistic conclusion makes it disingenuous to rely 
exclusively on Kozminski’s bare-bones definition of slavery.  
Indeed, faithfulness to Kozminski, invested as it is with 
earlier Court aspirations for Section 1’s fulfillment, demands 
inclusion of the definition’s endogenous components.  
Consequently, from hereon, Part I of this Article will use the 
expanded precedent-based definition of “slavery” under 
Section 1, i.e., “slavery” is a person’s empowerment to use, as 
well as the use of, physical coercion on another person who is 
thereby dominated and degraded. 
c. Dramatis Personae 
The Thirteenth Amendment’s ban safeguards all people 
from slavery, regardless of race102 or age.103
 
Louis Gates, Jr., ed., 1987) (bemoaning the degradation of slave life); Rev. 
Thomas H. Jones, Experience of Rev. Thomas H. Jones, in NORTH CAROLINA 
SLAVE NARRATIVES: THE LIVES OF MOSES ROPER, LUNSFORD LANE, MOSES 
GRANDY, & THOMAS H. JONES 185, 233 (William L. Andrews et al. eds., 2003) 
(chronicling the slave’s degradation). 
  With respect to 
 99. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 100. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 101. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 102. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883); Amar & Widawsky, supra 
note 24, at 1359; Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995); David P. Tedhams, The Reincarnation of 
1_BITENSKY FINAL.doc 7/1/2013  1:59 PM 
2013]        AN ANALYTICAL ODE TO PERSONHOOD 25 
would-be enslavers, the ban applies to both government and 
the private sector.104  The ban is also indifferent to a 
perpetrator’s intent.105  For example, the ban applies 
regardless of whether a perpetrator enslaves for profit or 
not.106
2. Comparing Corporal Punishment of Children to 
Slavery 
  In short, all are protected and all are barred by the 
Section 1 prohibition. 
If physical coercion is as integral to corporal punishment 
as it is to slavery, then the punishment would share the 
essential attribute of slavery under the Kozminski definition.  
This circumstance would convincingly contribute to 
categorizing the punishment as closely akin to slavery, 
thereby bringing the former within Section 1’s prohibition.107
a. The Punishment Fits the Definition of Slavery 
  
It is therefore necessary to determine whether corporal 
punishment of children too always involves physical coercion. 
It will be recalled that corporal punishment of children is 
the use of physical force upon a child’s body with the 
intention of causing the child to experience bodily pain so as 
to correct or punish the child’s behavior.108
 
“Jim Crow:” A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis of Colorado’s Amendment 2, 4 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 133, 139 (1994). 
  Consequently, by 
definition, corporal punishment of children always involves 
 103. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1359–60; see Doe v. Johnson, No. 
92C7661, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3284, at *8 (N.D. Ill. March 11, 1993) 
(suggesting that the child complainant might have been better off making her 
case under the Thirteenth Amendment); cf. STEVEN E. WOODWORTH & 
KENNETH J. WINKLE, ATLAS OF THE CIVIL WAR 144 (2004) (averring that the 
Thirteenth Amendment freed “all” of the slaves).  
 104. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1364; William M. Carter, Jr., Race, 
Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of 
Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1328–29 (2007). 
 105. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1359; Andrew Koppelman, Forced 
Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. Rev. 480, 
506 (1990); see Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 390 
n.17 (1982) (leaving open the question of whether there is any intent 
requirement under the Thirteenth Amendment); Carter, supra note 104, at 
1329 (positing that the Court has left the issue unresolved as to whether 
purposeful discrimination is required to show a Thirteenth Amendment 
violation). 
 106. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1359. 
 107. See supra notes 73, 75–79 and accompanying text.  
 108. BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 2. 
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coercion.  The punishment is not inflicted for its own sake or 
for no reason at all.  That way would be sheer madness or 
viciousness.  The punishment is instead imposed towards 
achieving a saner goal, i.e., coercing a child into compliance 
with adult wishes.  The adult administers the punishment as 
a goad to induce the child’s cessation of bad behavior or to 
deter the misbehavior’s onset or resumption.109
It is also beyond cavil that the “physical force,” referred 
to in the definition of “corporal punishment of children,” is not 
only coercive but also an act of physical violence.  A basic 
conceptual premise of physical chastisement is that its 
coercive power stems from bodily pain caused by the 
instrumentality of physical violence.
 
110
One manifestation is that corporal punishment of 
children neatly fulfills the elements of assault and battery, a 
crime of physical violence.  Assault and battery (different 
states use one or the other term to designate the same crime) 
may be correctly described as an “unlawful application of 
force to the person of another” resulting in “either a bodily 
injury” or, in some states, a mere “offensive touching.”
  If the punisher was to 
physically touch the child’s body so as to produce a sensation 
less acute than pain, the touching would be a tap, a pat, a 
tickle, a caress, a hug, or an accidental grazing, and would 
lose its capacity for coercing and punishing; rather, touching 
at these levels of intensity would convey a quite different 
message of playfulness, approval, affection, or, at worst, 
carelessness.  But, lest there be the slightest doubt, other 
unmistakable manifestations of corporal punishment’s 
intrinsic physical violence exist. 
111  
Under the approach exemplified by the Model Penal Code, in 
order to constitute criminal assault, the attack must cause 
“bodily injury,”112 defined as, among other things, “physical 
pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition.”113
 
 109. Id.  
  
Even a “temporarily painful blow” to another will be a battery 
“though afterward there is no wound or bruise or even pain to 
 110. See id. 
 111. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW §16.2, at 815–16 (4th ed. 2003); see 
Miguel Angel Méndez, A Sisyphean Task: The Common Law Approach to Mens 
Rea, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 411–12 (1994). 
 112. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1997); LAFAVE, supra note 111, §16.2, at 
816 n.6. 
 113. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0 (1997). 
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show for it.”114  The perpetrator must also have the mental 
state of intending to cause bodily pain or injury to another 
person.115
Corporal punishment of children is characterized by each 
of the above-described elements.  Corporal punishment of 
children is, at a minimum, a temporarily painful blow 
intended to cause somatic pain.
 
116  Thus, the one-for-one 
concordance of the legally prescribed elements of criminal 
assault and battery with the definitionally prescribed 
elements of corporal punishment of children is authoritative 
evidence that the punishment must be an act of physical 
violence.  State legislation erecting “reasonable” parental 
corporal punishment of children as a defense to assault or 
related charges117
Further corroboration that corporal punishment of 
children is a form of physical violence comes from the 
international community in the form of the 2006 “Report of 
the Independent Expert for the United Nations Study on 
Violence Against Children.”
 is a tacit admission of that conclusion. 
118  The study defines “violence” 
against children as “the intentional use of physical force or 
power, threatened or actual, against a child, by an individual 
or group, that either results in or has a high likelihood of 
resulting in actual or potential harm to the child’s health, 
survival, development or dignity.”119  The study explicitly 
subsumes within this formulation all corporal punishment of 
children.120
The upshot is that, when all is said and compared, a 
perfect parity emerges between the use of physical coercion in 
corporally punishing children and the use of physical coercion 
in slavery.  Of course, Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment 
demands no exact correspondence between slavery and any 
other interpersonal dynamic in order for the latter to fit 
 
 
 114. LAFAVE, supra note 111, §16.2, at 816. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 2. 
 117. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-403(1) (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 18-1-703(1)(a) (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18(1) (West 
2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1413(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 35.10(1) (McKinney 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-5 (2011). 
 118. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 20. 
 119. Id. ¶8, at 6 (citing the definition in WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD 
REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 5 (Etienne G. Krug et al. eds., 2002)). 
 120. Id. ¶¶26, 50. 
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within the former as a sufficiently slavelike relationship.121
If this heterodox conclusion appears farfetched even after 
orthodox analysis demonstrates its validity, further evidence 
is available to win over the stubbornly incredulous.  
Confirmation can be had, for example, from the fact that 
corporal punishment of children immanently and inevitably 
has the same two secondary attributes as slavery.  It will be 
recalled that slavery and corporal punishment of children 
share the identical primary constitutive attribute of use of 
physical coercion.
  
In exceeding Section 1’s demands, this total congruence 
attests to a certainty that corporal punishment of children is 
closely akin to slavery.  And, that attestation alone makes 
corporal punishment of children a violation of the 
constitutional prohibition on slavery. 
122  It will be also recalled that slavery’s use 
of physical coercion logically presupposes empowerment of 
the slave master to physically coerce the slave—the 
empowerment being a secondary endogenous attribute of 
slavery.123
This Article also previously established via antebellum 
history that use of physical coercion by slave master against 
slave inevitably induced slaves to experience domination and 
degradation—the other secondary endogenous attribute.
  Likewise, using corporal punishment logically 
necessitates empowerment of an adult to physically coerce the 
child.  Otherwise, the punishment would be an impossibility.  
Hence, both slavery and corporal punishment of children 
totally correspond with respect to possession of this secondary 
attribute. 
124
 
 121. See supra notes 70–76, 96–101 and accompanying text. 
  
But, does corporal punishment dominate and degrade 
children?  And, if so, does the punishment do this dirty work 
in a way that closely parallels the conditions causing slaves to 
suffer a diminution of self?  In attempting to respond to these 
questions, it is helpful to take a cue from a groundbreaking 
law review article by Professor Akhil Reed Amar and Daniel 
Widawsky who have created a powerful argument that 
prosecutable physical child abuse puts children in a slavelike 
condition in violation of Section 1 of the Thirteenth 
 122. See BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, passim. 
 123. See supra Part I.A.1.b. 
 124. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment.125  The authors opine that “[l]ike an antebellum 
slave, an abused child is subject to near total domination and 
degradation by another person, and is treated more as a 
possession than as a person.”126  Physical child abuse leads to 
this domination and degradation, the article explains, 
because the abuse cannot “plausibly [be] for the benefit of the 
child” and “utterly disregard[s]” the child’s interests.127
Amar and Widawsky take for granted that physical child 
abuse cannot be and is not ever good for children.  It is just as 
true that corporal punishment is never good for children 
though no timeworn bromide elevates that fact to 
conventional wisdom.  However, contemporary scientific 
evidence and growing philosophical scruples about the 
punishment verify the validity of this assertion.  They show 
that, not only does corporal punishment not benefit children 
in any meaningful way,
 
128 but this type of punishment utterly 
disregards children’s interests by putting their well-being at 
risk, sometimes seriously and permanently.129
A 2002 meta-analytic review inaugurated a seismic shift 
in the debate over corporal punishment of children.
 
130  Until 
then, each side in the controversy had been trapped in a 
rarefied game of cerebral ping-pong: “[no] sooner [were] 
scientific studies published that convict[ed] corporal 
punishment of potentially doing long lasting harm to children 
than” the opposite side would reply with newer scientific 
studies “exonerat[ing] the practice, and so on, back and forth 
and back and forth.”131  The meta-analytic review put, if not 
an end to, then at least an enormous damper upon the 
controversy for the reason that such a review is more reliable 
than the results of any single or even a few correlational or 
longitudinal studies,132
 
 125. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, passim.  
 and this particular meta-analytic 
review cast the weight of authority decidedly in the 
 126. Id. at 1364. 
 127. Id. at 1377. 
 128. See Elizabeth Thompson Gershoff, Corporal Punishment of Parents and 
Associated Child Behaviors and Experiences: A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical 
Review, 128 Psychol. Bull. 539 passim (2002); see infra notes 135–75. 
 129. See id.  
 130. See id. 
 131. BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 8. 
 132. See id. at 10–11, 14–17. 
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antispanking camp.133  Subsequent scientific studies, on the 
whole, have continued to confirm and build upon the review’s 
findings.134
 
 133. See Gershoff, supra note 128, passim.  
 
 134. See, e.g., Tracie O. Afifi et al., Physical Punishment, Childhood Abuse 
and Psychiatric Disorders, 30 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1093, 1094, 1099 (2006); 
George G. Bear et. al., Children’s Reasoning About Aggression: Differences 
Between Japan and the United States and Implications for School Discipline, 35 
SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 62, 63–64 (2006); Heather L. Bender et al., Use of Harsh 
Physical Discipline and Developmental Outcomes in Adolescence, 19 DEV. & 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 227, 238–41(2007) (ascertaining that parental corporal 
punishment is correlated with children’s ensuing deteriorating mental health); 
Sarah E. Fine et al., Anger Perception, Caregivers’ Use of Physical Discipline, 
and Aggression in Children at Risk, 13 SOC. DEV. 213, 224 (2004); Elizabeth T. 
Gershoff et al., Parent Discipline Practices in Six Countries: Frequency of Use, 
Associations with Child Behaviors, and Moderation by Cultural Normativeness, 
81 CHILD. DEV. 480, 484, 486–93 (2010) (determining that, in an international 
sample, mothers’ use of corporal punishment, expressing disappointment, and 
yelling were significantly related to increased child aggressiveness; that giving 
a time out, using corporal punishment, expressing disappointment, and 
shaming were significantly related to increased child anxiety symptoms; but, 
that mothers’ use of reasoning or getting the child to apologize did not predict 
behavior problems in the children); Scott D. Gest et al., Shared Book Reading 
and Children’s Language Comprehension Skills: The Moderating Role of 
Parental Discipline Practices, 19 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 319, 332 (2004); 
Joseph T.F. Lau et al., The Relationship Between Physical Maltreatment and 
Substance Use Among Adolescents: A Survey of 95,788 Adolescents in Hong 
Kong, 37 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 110, 111, 115–18 (2005) (finding an 
association between corporal punishment and subsequent alcohol and drug use 
in the children who had been hit); Prahbhjot Malhi & Munni Ray, Prevalence 
and Correlates of Corporal Punishment Among Adolescents, 46 STUDIA 
PSYCHOLOGIA 219, 224–25 (2004) (discovering that adolescents whose parents 
had corporally punished them had lower overall adjustment); Catherine A. 
Taylor et al., Mothers’ Spanking of 3-Year-Old Children and Subsequent Risk of 
Children’s Aggressive Behavior, 125 PEDIATRICS 1057, 1063 (2010) (concluding 
that parental corporal punishment of children increases the risk for higher 
levels of child aggression).  But see Robert E. Larzelere et al., Do Nonphysical 
Punishments Reduce Antisocial Behavior More Than Spanking?  A Comparison 
Using the Strongest Previous Causal Evidence Against Spanking, 10 BMC 
PEDIATRICS 1 (2010), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-
2431/10/10 (finding that spanking, grounding, and psychotherapy each equally 
appear to increase children’s antisocial behavior, and that deprivation of 
privileges and sending children to their rooms each partially appears to have 
the same effect, but contending that these appearances are due to residual 
confounding such that child effects on parents are mistaken for increased child 
antisocial behavior). 
     It should be noted that the Larzelere study, cited immediately above in this 
footnote as contrary authority, suffers from serious credibility problems.  The 
study is published in an “open access” journal that does minimal peer review 
and that is excluded from the ISI Journal Citation Database, an omission 
indicating that the journal is neither well-established nor scientifically 
reputable.  E-mail from Elizabeth T. Gershoff, Associate Professor, School of 
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The meta-analytic review determined that parental 
corporal punishment is associated with the following negative 
outcomes for the chastised children: decreased moral 
internalization, increased child aggression, increased child 
delinquent and antisocial conduct, decreased quality of the 
parent-child relationship, decreased child mental health, and 
increased risk of undergoing classic physical child abuse, and 
upon reaching adulthood, increased adult aggression, 
increased adult criminal and antisocial behavior, decreased 
adult mental health, and increased risk of abusing one’s own 
child or spouse.135
There unfortunately is a scarcity of studies directly 
dealing with corporal punishment of children in nonfamilial 
settings such as schools.
 
136
 
Human Ecology, The University of Texas at Austin, to author (Feb. 25, 2010, 
04:38 PM) [hereinafter Gershoff E-mail] (on file with author). 
  The few studies that do 
      The substance of the Larzelere study does not fare much better in terms of 
credibility.  For example, Larzelere relied in this work upon the National 
Longitudinal Study of Youth which has been used in many papers to document 
the link between corporal punishment and children’s externalized behaviors 
over time; yet, the Larzelere study does not even cite two such papers in which 
their author employed a more rigorous method of examining longitudinal 
impacts of corporal punishment and found long-term negative impacts of the 
punishment, after controlling for children’s initial behavior.  Id.  (The two 
articles overlooked by the Larzelere study are: Andrew Grogan-Kaylor, Corporal 
Punishment and the Growth Trajectory of Children’s Antisocial Behavior, 10 
CHILD MALTREATMENT 283 (2005), and Andrew Grogan-Kaylor, The Effect of 
Corporal Punishment on Antisocial Behavior in Children, 28 SOC. WORK RES. 
153 (2004)). 
     Besides the defect of incomplete research, the Larzelere study also stumbles 
by using faulty logic.  The central purpose of the study is to support the 
proposition that early childhood spanking is no worse than early childhood 
grounding and psychotherapy, with respect to increasing child antisocial 
behavior over time.  Larzelere et al., supra.  To that end, Larzelere and 
company proposed that what has given rise to findings of increased child 
antisocial behavior is not the punishment or therapy, but, rather, the 
circumstance that the children were more antisocial to begin with.  See id.  The 
logical weakness of this argument stems from the fact that the Larzelere study 
controlled for any effect the child had from the start on provoking more 
discipline.  Gershoff E-mail, supra.  So, the Larzelere study does not measure 
anything of interest regarding corporal punishment’s outcomes for children. 
 135. Gershoff, supra note 128, at 544. 
 136. See, e.g., Norma D. Feshback & Seymour Feshback, Aggression in the 
Schools: Toward Reducing Ethnic Conflict and Enhancing Ethnic 
Understanding, in VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY AND THE 
COMMUNITY 269, 274 (Penelope K. Trickett & Cynthia J. Schellenbach eds., 
1998); Stephen S. Owen, The Relationship Between Social Capital and Corporal 
Punishment in Schools: A Theoretical Inquiry, 37 YOUTH & SOC’Y 85, 88 (2005); 
Melissa J. Spencer, Corporal Punishment and Ridicule—Residual Psychological 
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concentrate on school paddling are, however, quite as 
damning as the studies on parental use of the punishment.137  
The lacuna is also bridged to some degree by the studies on 
parental corporal punishment since their results can fairly be 
extrapolated to the school context.138
It should be underscored that all of this data proves only 
that corporal punishment of children is correlated with the 
identified adverse impacts; the data do not show that such 
punishment causes these impacts.
 
139
 
Effects in Early Adulthood: Implications for Counselors 13 (May 1999) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech. University). 
  The significance of such 
correlational data, then, is that some children who are 
corporally punished will be negatively affected by it and that 
other children will emerge from the experience relatively 
unscathed.  There is no reliable predictor as to which children 
 137. For social science studies reporting on indirect testing for the effects of 
school corporal punishment on children, see J. Csorba et al., Family-and School-
Related Stresses in Depressed Hungarian Children, 16 EUR PSYCHIATRY 18, 25 
(2001) (determining that an association exists between school corporal 
punishment and later child depression); Maria R. Czumbil & Irwin A. Hyman, 
What Happens When Corporal Punishment Is Legal?, 12 J. INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE 309, 312 (1997) (relying upon newspaper reports of school corporal 
punishment to deduce that abusiveness of such punishment increases with the 
frequency of its use); Daniel J. Flannery et al., Violence Exposure, Psychological 
Trauma, and Suicide Risk in a Community Sample of Dangerously Violent 
Adolescents, 40 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 435, 440 (2001) 
(publishing results of a correlational study of children subjected to violence “in 
the home, neighborhood, and school”); Soc’y for Adolescent Med., Corporal 
Punishment in Schools: Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, 32 
J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 385, 388 (2003) (reporting on studies showing that 
school corporal punishment creates an educational environment which is 
“unproductive” and “nullifying” and which has negative psychological impacts 
on pupils); cf. Harriet L. MacMillan et al., Slapping and Spanking in Childhood 
and Its Association with Lifetime Prevalence of Psychiatric Disorders in a 
General Population Sample, 161 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 805, 809 (1999) (presenting 
the results of a cross-sectional study of corporal punishment of children 
dispensed by “any adult”). 
 138. E-mail from Elizabeth Gershoff, Assistant Professor, School of Social 
Work, University of Michigan, to author (Sept. 1, 2004) (on file with author). 
 139. For an extended discussion about the fact that most relevant social 
science studies show only correlative rather than causative relationships 
between corporal punishment of children and the behavior of and psychological 
outcomes for those children, see BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 
18, at 10 n.55, 11 n.59.  Indeed, scientists purposefully shun causative studies of 
spanking children because of ethical concerns about subjecting children to 
physical pain when there is no established benefit from doing so.  E-mail from 
Joan Durrant, Associate Professor, Head of Family Studies, University of 
Manitoba, to author (Oct. 9, 2002) (on file with author). 
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will be which.140
All in all, science is a constructive rebuke to any further 
use of corporal punishment on children.  But, there are other 
indicia of the punishment’s detrimental impacts as well.  
Anecdotal reporting reveals that corporal punishment may, 
not surprisingly, cause physical injuries.  Abrasions and 
hematomas are commonplace.
  Corporal punishment thus effectively puts 
every child at risk. 
141  More serious bodily injuries 
occur, too, e.g., whiplash,142 sciatic nerve damage,143 fracture 
of the sacrum,144 and hemorrhaging.145
Ethical concerns also have often entered the discourse 
about corporal punishment of children.  The charge has been 
leveled that corporal punishment of children is immoral 
because it is the intentional gratuitous infliction of pain on 
children’s bodies.
 
146  According to the definition of corporal 
punishment of children used here, this type of discipline must 
be intentional and must inflict pain on children’s bodies in 
order for the discipline to be corporal punishment.147  The 
punishment is gratuitous inasmuch as there are nonviolent, 
more effective tactics available for disciplining children.148
 
 140. See BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 9; Bitensky, 
supra note 19, at 1400; cf. Gershoff, supra note 128, at 609 (concluding that 
corporal punishment should have strong and consistently positive effects on 
children for psychologists to recommend it, but that the punishment does not 
remotely meet this standard). 
  A 
 141. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 657 (1977) (adverting to the 
fact that school paddling of one of the petitioners caused a hematoma); P.B. v. 
Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1299–1300, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996) (ruling that a high school 
principal violated students’ substantive due process rights in using corporal 
punishment on them so as to produce bruising, among other harms); MICHAEL 
J. MARSHALL, WHY SPANKING DOESN’T WORK: STOPPING THIS BAD HABIT AND 
GETTING THE UPPER HAND ON EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE 26 (2002) (relating that 
pediatricians are alarmed at the number of injuries which result from 
parentally inflicted corporal punishment). 
 142. Soc’y for Adolescent Med., supra note 137, at 389. 
 143. Spencer, supra note 136, at 47. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 2–5; HYMAN, 
supra note 29, at 39–40 (commenting that because corporal punishment is the 
gratuitous infliction of bodily pain on children, it is abusive in nature). 
 147. See BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 2–3. 
 148. For authors and organizations identifying nonviolent alternatives to 
corporal punishment of children, see KATHARINE C. KERSEY, DON’T TAKE IT OUT 
ON YOUR KIDS!  A PARENT’S GUIDE TO POSITIVE DISCIPLINE 49–72 (rev. ed. 
1994); WILLIAM SEARS & MARTHA SEARS, THE DISCIPLINE BOOK: EVERYTHING 
YOU NEED TO KNOW TO HAVE A BETTER-BEHAVED CHILD—FROM BIRTH TO AGE 
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longstanding inventory of nonviolent disciplinary tactics 
includes, but is not limited to, deprivation of privileges,149 
reasoning,150 letting the child suffer the natural 
consequences, within reason, of his or her naughtiness,151 
grounding,152 asking the child to suggest a fitting and 
reasonable nonviolent punishment,153 negotiation and 
compromise, etc.154  These tactics are user friendly; they can 
easily be applied by any adult supervising children in any 
venue.  Schools additionally may resort to such tactics as in-
school suspension,155 parent pickup,156 Saturday schooling,157 
restitution,158 detention, etc.;159 less austere measures include 
providing a character education curriculum,160 enlisting the 
assistance of school psychologists and counselors,161 
contracting with students for better conduct,162 and engaging 
in peer mediation.163
 
 
 
TEN 161–81 (1995); CAROLYN WEBSTER-STRATTON & MARTIN HERBERT, 
TROUBLED FAMILIES—PROBLEM CHILDREN: WORKING WITH PARENTS: A 
COLLABORATIVE PROCESS 285 (1994); Discipline at School (NCACPS): School 
Corporal Punishment Alternatives, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE, 
http://www.stophitting.com/index.php?page=alternatives (last visited Oct. 25, 
2012) [hereinafter CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE, Alternatives].  
 149. See SEARS & SEARS, supra note 148, at 181; STRATTON-WEBSTER & 
HERBERT, supra note 148, at 285. 
 150. See COMER & POUSSAINT, supra note 42, at 50; SEARS & SEARS, supra 
note 148, at 162–63. 
 151. See KERSEY, supra note 147, at 63–64; JANE NELSON ET AL., POSITIVE 
DISCIPLINE A–Z: 1001 SOLUTIONS TO EVERYDAY PARENTING PROBLEMS 189–90 
(1993); WEBSTER-STRATTON & HERBERT, supra note 148, at 285. 
 152. See THOMAS W. PHELAN, 1-2-3 MAGIC 39 (4th ed. 2010). 
 153. See MELVIN L. SILBERMAN & SUSAN A. WHEELAN, HOW TO DISCIPLINE 
WITHOUT FEELING GUILTY: ASSERTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH CHILDREN 112 
(1980). 
 154. See SEARS & SEARS, supra note 148, at 178–81; SILBERMAN & WHEELAN, 
supra note 153, at 106–10. 
 155. CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE, Alternatives, supra note 148. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.; see generally IRWIN A. HYMAN ET AL., SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND 
SCHOOL VIOLENCE: THE TEACHER VARIANCE APPROACH 18, 47–48 (1997); Bear 
et al., supra note 134, at 64. 
 161. CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE, Alternatives, supra note 148. 
 162. See CHARLES H. WOLFGANG, SOLVING DISCIPLINE AND CLASSROOM 
MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS: METHODS AND MODELS FOR TODAY’S TEACHERS 196 
(5th ed. 2001). 
 163. CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE, Alternatives, supra note 148. 
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The existence of so many nonviolent options means that, 
even if corporal punishment was a benefit as well as a 
detriment to children, there still would be no intelligent 
justification for using a punishment producing any detriment.  
The fact is, though, that corporal punishment’s impacts are 
wholly in the negative column—except for one arguably 
positive effect.  The 2002 meta-analytic review demonstrates 
that corporal punishment tends to cause the child’s 
immediate cessation of his or her misbehavior.164  From the 
vantage point of the frustrated adult who is trying to control 
an unruly or defiant child, achieving prompt child compliance 
should appear a godsend.  The catch is that, upon further 
examination, this quick fix turns out to be no fix at all.  The 
cessation is ephemeral, and teaches the child nothing of 
lasting import.165  Indeed, corporal punishment has been 
shown to actually impede moral internalization, or the 
development of conscience, a chief aim of child discipline.166
The point of the foregoing digression into disciplinary 
alternatives is this: corporal punishment of children is 
gratuitous because it is unnecessary to achieving its supposed 
end and never can achieve that end.  No caring, responsible 
adult, who is made aware of corporal punishment’s effects, 
would desire to subject a child to the needless pain and 
suffering such punishment brings.  Moreover, this already 
major ethical concern is magnified many times over when 
corporal punishment’s adverse outcomes for children, in 
addition to inducing somatic pain, are thrown into the mix. 
 
 
 
 164. See Gershoff, supra note 128, at 544; see Carolyn Hilarski, Corporal 
Punishment: Another Form of School Violence, in KIDS AND VIOLENCE: THE 
INVISIBLE SCHOOL EXPERIENCE 59, 71 (Catherine N. Dulmus & Karen M. 
Sowers eds., 2004). 
 165. Irwin A. Hyman et al., Paddling and Pro-Paddling Polemics: Refuting 
Nineteenth Century Pedagogy, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 74, 79 (2002); Irwin A. Hyman, 
Using Research to Change Public Policy: Reflections on 20 Years of Effort to 
Eliminate Corporal Punishment in Schools, 98 PEDIATRICS 818, 820 (1996); see 
PENELOPE LEACH, YOUR GROWING CHILD: FROM BABYHOOD THROUGH 
ADOLESCENCE 224 (1998) (noting that children never can remember why they 
were smacked). 
 166. Gershoff, supra note 128, at 544; see Soc’y for Adolescent Med., supra 
note 137, at 388 (suggesting that school corporal punishment merely teaches 
students to avoid getting caught with their 'hands in the cookie jar'); cf. Bear et 
al., supra note 134, at 63 (commenting that punitive discipline of schoolchildren 
tends to encourage a “hedonistic perspective” to moral reasoning). 
1_BITENSKY FINAL.doc 7/1/2013  1:59 PM 
36 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
Another qualm of conscience is that corporal punishment 
of children, to the extent the punishment is legal, is 
profoundly unfair.167  The unfairness stems from the fact that 
children may be subjected to legalized physical violence 
against which adults are protected by law.168  As previously 
discussed, if corporal punishment was not denominated as 
such, the punishment would meet all of the elements of a 
criminal assault and battery.169  The existence of laws 
criminalizing assault and battery manifests a society’s moral 
judgment that hitting people is not acceptable as a behavior 
modification or dispute resolution technique among adults.170  
There appears to be no reason why the moral judgment 
undergirding these laws should change simply because the 
victim of the assault and battery is a minor in the custody or 
under the supervision of the adult punisher.  To the contrary, 
under those circumstances, there is even greater cause to 
abstain from physical force since children are usually smaller, 
weaker, and more vulnerable and dependent than the 
average adult;171 they are, furthermore, still developing 
physically, intellectually, and psychologically,172
 
 167. BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 5–7; NEWELL, 
supra note 1, at 12; Benjamin Shmueli, What Has Feminism Got to Do with 
Children’s Rights?  A Case Study of a Ban on Corporal Punishment, 22 WIS. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 177, 218 (2007) (proposing that it may be concordant with 
feminism to regard corporal punishment of children as inconsistent with 
principles of equality). 
 and corporal 
 168. BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT,  supra note 18, at 5. 
 169. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 170. For articles on the expressive function of the criminal law in general, see 
Elaine M. Chiu, Culture in our Midst, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 233 
(2006); Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1439 (2001); Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the 
Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law Through a Criminal Sunset 
Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1327, 1335–36 (2008). 
 171. See BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 5 (noting 
children’s relative vulnerability and reliance upon adults); Susan H. Bitensky, 
Spare the Rod, Embrace our Humanity: Toward a New Legal Regime 
Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 
435–36 (1998) (describing children as having “less than average adult abilities” 
and as being more vulnerable than the average adult). 
 172. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, YOUR CHILD: 
EMOTIONAL, BEHAVIORAL, AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT FROM BIRTH 
THROUGH PREADOLESCENCE passim (David B. Pruitt ed., 1998); PATRICIA D. 
FOSARELLI, ASAP: AGES, STAGES, AND PHASES: FROM INFANCY TO 
ADOLESCENCE: INTEGRATING PHYSICAL, SOCIAL, EMOTIONAL, INTELLECTUAL, 
AND SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT passim (2006). 
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punishment may distort these processes.173  It also 
exacerbates the inequity immeasurably that the punishment 
has no redeeming disciplinary value and that nonviolent 
modes of disciplining children are at the ready.174
If a practice objectively holds many dangers for a cohort 
of people and no real benefits, then continued use of that 
practice objectively debases the cohort and denotes the 
latter’s consummate subjugation, whatever subjective 
thoughts the victimizers or the victims may cling to.  The 
bleak and unavoidable message is that the welfare of the 
victims really cannot matter very much and, hence, that the 
victims themselves cannot matter very much.  Scientific 
studies and philosophical insights about corporal punishment 
of children leave no doubt anymore that the punishment 
“utterly disregard[s]” children’s interests to the same degree 
as prosecutable physical child abuse.
 
175
In the end, it comes down to this.  Corporal punishment 
of children fits the primary attribute of slavery as defined by 
Kozminski.  That dovetailing alone warrants classifying the 
punishment as a form of slavery forbidden by Section 1.  The 
supplementary analysis demonstrating that corporal 
punishment of children shares both of slavery’s secondary 
endogenic attributes makes the correspondence tighter still, 
and confirms these practices’ constitutional equivalency.  
There is no out; if slavery is barred by Section 1, then so is 
corporal punishment of children. 
  Since corporal 
punishment causes the child to suffer domination and 
degradation just as much as physical coercion caused the 
same suffering in slaves, the second endogenous attribute of 
slavery is an endogenous attribute of corporal punishment of 
children as well. 
 
 173. See supra note 135 and accompanying text; cf. U.N. Econ. & Soc. 
Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur, Submitted to Commission on Human 
Rights, Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/35, 52d Sess., 
para. 10 (1996), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/ 
0/691b21854d334918802566aa005d5209?Opendocument (opining, with respect 
to torture and ill-treatment of children, that “children are necessarily more 
vulnerable to the effects of torture and, because they are in the critical stages of 
physical and psychological development, may suffer graver consequences than 
similarly ill-treated adults”). 
 174. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 175. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1377. 
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b. Even Punishment Within the Family is Not 
Exempt from Section 1’s Ban on Slavery 
There is something counterintuitive and deeply 
disquieting about an analytical pairing of parental corporal 
punishment with parents treating their children as no better 
than slaves.  Although it is speculation, the origin of the 
unease may be that, because spanking juveniles has been an 
ingrained and pervasive way of disciplining them in this 
country,176 the parenting role has, in some people’s minds and 
perhaps subconsciously, become synonymous with reliance on 
such punishment.  These adults might fearfully conclude that 
an attack on corporal punishment of children must also be an 
attack on parenting—an attack subverting, sub rosa, the 
parent-child bond and family values.177
Feelings of hostility or resistance to the constitutional 
equivalency, to the extent they materialize, may be partially 
actuated by that which is vital to and healthy about the 
human condition.  It goes without saying that the parent-
child relationship is absolutely essential to the perpetuation 
and flourishing of the species; the relationship is furthermore 
often a source of joy and affirmation for all concerned.  In 
order to secure these payoffs, parents must hold a position of 
responsibility and authority vis-á-vis their offspring.
 
178  There 
are, however, lines that parents may not cross even in 
relation to their own children.  These are the lines that 
American society has drawn to demarcate productive or at 
least benign parenting from the more toxic variety.179
 
 176. MARSHALL, supra note 141, at 179 JOHN ROSEMOND, TO SPANK OR NOT 
TO SPANK: A PARENTS’ HANDBOOK 7–8 (1994); ELIZABETH T. GERSHOFF, REPORT 
ON PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: WHAT RESEARCH TELLS US 
ABOUT ITS EFFECTS ON CHILDREN 11 (2008), available at 
http://www.phoenixchildrens.com/PDFs/principles_and_practices-of_effective_ 
discipline.pdf (reporting that corporal punishment of children in the United 
States goes back to at least the early seventeenth century, though there has 
been a decline in adults’ approval of the punishment over the past few decades). 
  Not all 
parenting enjoys equal status before the law; inimical child 
 177. See, e.g., ROSEMOND, supra note 176, at 1–14 (attributing to the 
“antispanking movement” the demonization of parents and parental authority). 
 178. See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, CARING FOR YOUR BABY AND YOUNG 
CHILD: BIRTH TO AGE 5, at 242 (Steven B. Shelov et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009); 
FOSTER CLINE & JIM FAY, PARENTING TEENS WITH LOVE AND LOGIC: PREPARING 
ADOLESCENTS FOR RESPONSIBLE ADULTHOOD 90 (updated and expanded ed. 
2006); SEARS & SEARS, supra note 148, at 4. 
 179. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
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rearing practices graced by custom have been known to fall by 
the wayside in the wake of legislative reform or evolving 
judicial interpretations delegitimizing them.180  These 
practices remain out of legal bounds though some of them 
may continue to evoke nostalgia and yearning for their 
return.181  Jurists, trained to differentiate emotional 
preferences from facts and law,182
The Thirteenth Amendment analysis presented here 
raises the possibility of that fact-based progress by shifting 
the constitutional line which adults, including parents, 
should no longer be allowed to cross in relation to minors.  
And, while the analysis unreservedly insists that adult use of 
corporal punishment on children reproduces a slave master-
slave relationship for at least the duration of each instance of 
the punishment, there is no ulterior agenda to slyly impugn 
custodial or other aspects of the parent-child relationship.  
Indeed, since corporal punishment is associated with 
deterioration in the quality of parent-child interactions,
 are particularly well-
equipped to struggle against retrospective romanticization of 
unlovely realities.  Jurists are enabled, where many others 
are not, to expose harmful traditional prejudices as ill-advised 
or anachronistic and to move society toward fact-based 
progress through legal reform. 
183
 
 180. For example, in 1961, Dr. C. Henry Kempe introduced with considerable 
fanfare the “battered-child syndrome,” i.e., “ ‘a clinical condition in young 
children who have received serious physical abuse, generally from a parent or a 
foster parent’ ”  in a well-educated and financially stable family.  LEROY ASHBY, 
ENDANGERED CHILDREN: DEPENDENCY, NEGLECT, AND ABUSE IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 134 (1997).  This led to the passage of laws requiring physicians to 
report suspected cases of child abuse, thereby decreasing the relative privacy 
and immunity that had been enjoyed by middle- and upper-class parents vis-á-
vis child abuse.  Id.  Another example is the passage of laws in the United 
States making school compulsory for children within certain age ranges.  See 
Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective 
Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 823 (1985) (stating that all states 
had compulsory education laws by 1918).  Compulsory education laws interfered 
with some parents’ reliance on child labor.  See STEVEN MINTZ, HUCK’S RAFT: A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN CHILDHOOD 152–53, 182 (2004). 
 
banning the punishment should actually improve those 
interactions and strengthen family life. 
 181. Cf. MINTZ, supra note 180, at 75, 275–76 (noting successive generations’ 
episodic nostalgia for the childhoods of yesteryear). 
 182. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS 
STUDY 116 (1960); Sallyanne Payton, Is Thinking Like a Lawyer Enough?, 18 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 233, 236 (1985). 
 183. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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The fact is that Section 1 has long governed within as 
well as outside of the family.  Concisely put, Section 1 
prohibits a person from enslaving his or her relatives as well 
as anyone else.184  There is a wealth of evidence to this effect.  
As Amar and Widawsky aptly remark, “[t]he history of the 
[Thirteenth] Amendment makes clear that slavery was 
understood as intimately connected with issues of family 
servitude.”185  Not only did antebellum slavery frequently 
result in an informal polygamy between the slave master and 
his “harem” of female slaves,186 but the arrangement also 
produced “a large number of mulatto offspring who were 
treated as slaves by their biological fathers.”187  Amar and 
Widawsky thus conclude that “the relationship between 
master and slave in many cases was quite literally a 
relationship between biological father and child.”188
This awkward fact of life was not lost on the 
Congressmen who debated the passage of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  Both supporters and opponents of the 
Amendment were aware that ending slavery would effectively 
 
 
 184. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1359, 1373–75; see Nicholson v. 
Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (musing that the Thirteenth 
Amendment could be construed to cover children who are forcibly and 
unnecessarily removed from the custody of their mothers and placed in foster 
care); MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION 
OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 248 & n.108 (2001) (claiming 
that the Thirteenth Amendment should protect abused mothers, neglected 
children, and “all other victims of relations reminiscent of slavery”); Mundorff, 
supra note 75, at 140–42, 145, 187 (arguing that the child welfare system, in 
unnecessarily removing many children from their families, replicates slavery); 
cf. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (equating the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s abolition of slavery with “establish[ing] universal freedom”); In re 
Turner, 1 Abb. U.S. 84, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339–40 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247) 
(holding that the apprenticeship of a Black child, with the evident consent of 
her mother, in conditions unequal to those enjoyed by white apprentices, 
constituted involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 185. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1366. 
 186. FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 8, at 139–40; Amar & Widawsky, supra 
note 24, at 1366; Camille A. Nelson, American Husbandry: Legal Norms 
Impacting the Production of (Re)productivity, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 18, 25 
(2007); Katyal, supra note 79, at 797–98. 
 187. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1367; Lisa Haberman, The 
Seduction of Power: An Analogy of Incest and Antebellum Slavery, 13 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 307, 314 (2002); see A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. 
Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and 
Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 2006 (1989) (stating that the mulatto 
children of Black female slaves were generally classified as slaves). 
 188. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1367. 
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involve the government in reordering highly intimate 
relationships.189  Yet, the Amendment’s adoption was 
ultimately not antifamily.  Rather, it led to the salvation of 
Blacks’ family ties which otherwise might well have been 
sundered on the auction block.190
Evidently disregarding or overlooking this history 
catapulting the Amendment into the family circle, the 
Supreme Court generalized in Robertson v. Baldwin
 
191 that 
the Amendment was not meant to apply to the “exceptional” 
case of “the right of parents and guardians to the custody of 
their minor children or wards.”192  Some scholars have reacted 
to the Court’s remark with apparent misgivings that it could 
be extended to preclude application of the Amendment to 
parent-child relationships.193  While no pronouncement of the 
Court, however casually made, should be given short shrift, 
consternation over this statement is uncalled for.  The 
statement is acknowledged by legal scholars to be a dictum.194
 
 189. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2D SESS. 151 (1865) (Congressman 
Rogers in opposition to the Thirteenth Amendment); CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 
2D SESS. 193 (1865) (Congressman Kasson in support of the Thirteenth 
Amendment); CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1483 (1864) (Congressman 
Powell in opposition to the Thirteenth Amendment); CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 
1ST SESS. 1439 (1864) (Congressman Harlan in support of the Thirteenth 
Amendment); CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2941 (1864) (Congressman 
Wood in opposition to the Thirteenth Amendment); see Amar & Widawsky, 
supra note 24, at 1367–68; Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 177–78 (1951). 
  
The Robertson Court held that federal enactments 
 190. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1373; see Alexander Tsesis, 
Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 
B.C. L. REV. 307, 373–75 (2004). 
 191. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897). 
 192. The Robertson Court’s language on this score was as follows: 
It is clear . . . that the [Thirteenth] amendment was not intended to 
introduce any novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions of 
service which have always been treated as exceptional, such as military 
and naval enlistments, or to disturb the right of parents and guardians 
to the custody of their minor children or wards.  
Id. at 282 (emphasis added). 
 193. See, e.g., Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1373–74 (suggesting that 
the Robertson opinion intimates “that family relations are generally not within 
the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment”); Frank Cracchiolo, Robertson v. 
Baldwin and the Emancipation of Children, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 437, 
442 (2004). 
 194. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1373–74; Sally F. Goldfarb, “No 
Civilized System of Justice”: The Fate of the Violence Against Women Act, 102 
W. VA. L. REV. 499, 529 n.253 (2000); Mundorff, supra note 75, at 144. 
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authorizing the forcible return of deserting seamen to their 
vessels did not, in principle, unconstitutionally conflict with 
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary 
servitude,195 but that the enactments were unconstitutional 
insofar as they conferred authority upon justices of the peace 
to do the apprehending and returning.196
But, even if the Robertson dictum was part of the holding, 
that circumstance would not nullify or undermine the instant 
Thirteenth Amendment argument against parental corporal 
punishment of children.  It bears repeating that the 
constitutional arguments proffered in this Article are not 
intended to implicate the parent-child relationship other than 
in connection with the use of corporal punishment.
  The Court’s 
musings about child custody are not related to these holdings, 
and are without precedential effect. 
197  This 
Article is not proposing, implicitly or explicitly, loss of custody 
as a remedy for parental corporal punishment of children.  
Instead, this Article advocates recognition of an implied ban 
on the punishment under the Amendment’s Section 1 
proscription of slavery,198 hypothesizes about opportunities 
under Section 1 for damages and other relief (not involving 
custody),199 and considers the exercise of congressional power 
under Section 2 to legislate towards these ends (again, not so 
as to involve custody).200
The essential narrative under the Thirteenth 
Amendment is that its prohibitions have regulated families 
for well over a century, without undermining parental 
authority or the family.  Understanding the prohibition on 
slavery to contain an implicit prohibition on corporal 
punishment of children can, if the science is to be credited, 
only work to transform the Amendment into an 
 
 
 195. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 287–88. 
 196. Id. at 280. 
 197. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 198. See supra Part I.A. 
 199. See infra Part I.B. 
 200. See infra Part. II.A.  A postscript may be in order before leaving this 
part of the Article.  With the exception of Amar and Widawsky, legal scholars 
have strangely either provided their own perspicacious definitions of slavery or 
they have used the word “slavery” without addressing its interior definitional 
components.  See, e.g., Tsesis, supra note 190, passim.  Though it would be 
speculation to say so, these latter two approaches may stem from the paucity of 
precedent on what “slavery” means and from the term’s seeming self-evident 
meaning arising from Americans’ repeated exposure to Civil War history. 
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instrumentality for affirmatively valuing and reinforcing the 
parent-child relationship201
B. Implementation of Section 1’s Implied Prohibition on 
Corporal Punishment of Children 
 and, therefore, family integrity. 
If the Supreme Court was some day to recognize the 
existence, in the Thirteenth Amendment’s express prohibition 
on slavery, of an implicit prohibition on corporal punishment 
of children, the issue would be sure to arise as to whether this 
doctrinal development would have any real-world 
consequences.  This Article contends that its theoretical 
innovation may have at least two practical manifestations.  
First, the Court’s recognition of the doctrine should have a 
pedagogical function202 impacting adults and children over 
time.203  Second, the Court’s recognition should make some 
litigation viable against violators of the Amendment’s implicit 
prohibition even in the absence of a congressional 
enforcement statute.204
1. Preventing Corporal Punishment of Children: The 
Pedagogical Function of Section 1’s Implied 
Prohibition on the Punishment 
  Because this Article’s primary focus 
is doctrinal, the instant discussion is an apercu.  Its purpose 
is to highlight that a constitutional ban on corporal 
punishment does not have to be a paper tiger, and should be 
capable of at least some preventative or remedial 
implementation. 
There is a sense in which law is pedagogy.  Law is 
promulgated to be known;205
 
 201. See supra note 135; see infra notes 342–43 and accompanying text. 
 it could neither restrain nor 
mandate behavior if the contents were kept secret.  By 
 202. It should be clarified that what I call law’s “pedagogical function,” many 
legal scholars have dubbed law’s “expressive function.”  E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, 
On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 passim (1996).  I 
prefer my nomenclature as a nearer approach to the legal dynamic I wish to 
convey in this Article. 
 203. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 204. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 205. Hegel declared that law is not law unless it is known.  GEORGE HEGEL, 
HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 135 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 
1967); see GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 397 (2010) (remarking that both Locke and 
Hobbes were of the view that law must be known and understood in order to be 
law). 
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knowing the law, citizens not only react to the particular rule 
obedience expected of them on pain of suffering some 
governmentally imposed unpleasantness; they also 
simultaneously receive and are otherwise influenced by the 
government’s official message on a matter.206  This message 
may have an especially strong pedagogical influence, even 
without active enforcement or significant penalties, because it 
carries the imprimatur of the state.  And, the state, until it is 
overthrown, collapses, or is on the verge of one of those 
calamities, is the voice of sovereignty and therefore of unique 
legitimacy.207
What happens to law’s messages once promulgation 
initiates their dissemination?  There is much conjecture about 
how the law’s lessons are learned.
  Indeed, law may be the nonpareil of bully 
pulpits. 
208
 
 206. See ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF 
ARISTOTLE 952, 1105 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); PLATO, Laws VII, in THE 
COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, INCLUDING THE LETTERS 1418–19, 1502 
(Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 5th prtg. 1969) (A.E. Taylor trans., 
1934); Paul Brest, The Thirty-First Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture: 
Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 179 (1986); Anne Norton, 
Transubstantiation: The Dialectic of Constitutional Authority, 55 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 458, 459, 469 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 202, at 2024–30.  But see 
Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1363, 1461–1500 (2000) (arguing against any expressive purposes of 
law). 
  In my judgment, the 
most persuasive conceit is that each person tends to gradually 
internalize law’s most relevant communiqués.  It is as if a 
state-to-person ideational osmosis occurs.  When enough 
people have individually absorbed law’s important messages, 
the great mass of altered consciousnesses qualitatively 
metamorphoses, i.e., the individually absorbed messages 
 207. See Karol Soltan, Delegation to Courts and Legitimacy, 65 MD. L. REV. 
115, 123 (2006); cf. David A. Strauss, Reply: Legitimacy and Obedience, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1855 (2005) (describing Professor Richard Fallon’s 
definition of “sociological legitimacy” as the circumstance where government 
action “is generally accepted by the population as morally binding in some 
way”). 
 208. See, e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The 
Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of 
Informative Law, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 1–3 (2003) (summarizing a range of 
scholarly theories, including the authors’ own, on how law fulfills an expressive 
role); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 35, 44–72 (2002) (surveying scholarly theories, including his own, on the 
expressive processes of law); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties 
Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1955–62 (2002) (canvassing scholarly 
theories on the workings of human rights treaties’ expressive operation). 
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become societal norms of what constitutes acceptable 
behavior.209
However, some laws are more equal than others when it 
comes to catalyzing societal norm creation.  Without implying 
that this didactic power is always proportional to the prestige 
attached to a law, in the United States the federal 
Constitution probably has the most pedagogical muscle 
among the nation’s  domestic laws.  Aside from the fact that, 
legally, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land,
 
210 
Americans are also generally inclined to revere it211 as a 
veritable secular Bible.212
If corporal punishment of children was within the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s interdiction of slavery, the ban on 
the punishment resulting therefrom would, ipso facto, acquire 
preeminent pedagogical value.  Constitutional embrace of the 
ban would accelerate both the depth and pervasiveness of the 
norm-creation process against the punishment,
 
213
 
 209. For roughly analogous conceptions of internalization of legal norms 
(though each conception involves distinct mechanics), see Robert Cooter, 
Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 597–607 (1998) 
(proposing three phases of internalization: aligning law with ethics, depending 
on people’s respect for the law, and looking to self-motivated improvements to 
inspire individuals to engage in civic-minded conduct); Alex Geisinger, A Group 
Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV. 605, 631–
39 (2004) (postulating group identity as a component in the individual’s 
absorption of legal norms); and Norton, supra note 206, at 463–64 (describing 
the dialectical relationship between the Constitution and man’s inward being). 
 beyond the 
likely rate of notional change that might be initiated by less 
 210. The Constitution is the paramount law in the United States.  The 
Supremacy Clause provides that, along with federal law and treaties, the 
Constitution is “the supreme Law of the Land.”  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  The 
last phrase of the Clause (“any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to 
the Contrary notwithstanding”) further indicates that, as between the aforesaid 
supreme laws and conflicting State laws, the former must prevail.  Id.  
However, the Court has also held that the Constitution preempts other federal 
law repugnant to the Constitution, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176–80 
(1803), and that the Constitution trumps conflicting treaties.  See Reid v. 
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality decision) (holding that an executive 
agreement between the United States and another country cannot be valid if it 
runs afoul of the Constitution). 
 211. ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 55 (1987); Beau 
Breslin, Is There a Paradox in Amending a Sacred Text?, 69 MD. L. REV. 66, 71 
(2009). 
 212. THOMAS PAINE, The Rights of Man, in THOMAS PAINE READER 208, 287 
(Michael Foot & Isaac Kramnick eds., 1987) (1791–92) (referring to the 
Constitution as “the political bible of the state”). 
 213. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text. 
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cherished laws or by other means of publicity and education. 
Once attitudinal shifts are underway, actual use of 
corporal punishment on children should start to slow as 
well.214  The preventative effect of the constitutional ban 
would become increasingly evident as a palpable societal 
phenomenon.  Adults would no longer be prone to hit children 
inasmuch as social pressure to refrain would be omnipresent 
and overpowering.215  Ultimately, refraining could become 
second nature: it is possible that, in the far future, it may not 
even occur to adults to use corporal punishment on 
children.216
The pedagogical dynamics of law, even beyond the 
deterrence stemming from penalties, are not mere wishful 
thinking.  Law’s overt didactic effects have been repeatedly 
observed.
 
217  For example, as of this writing, thirty-three 
countries have enacted or adjudicated absolute bans on all 
corporal punishment of children.218
 
 214. See infra notes 217, 222 and accompanying text. 
  In these jurisdictions, the 
 215. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 216. It is admittedly speculation to assert, as the text above does, that in the 
“far future” it will not even cross adults’ minds to hit children for disciplinary 
reasons.  But, speculation may be creditable or not. 
     I contend, based on extrapolation from shared historical experience, that my 
assertion about corporal punishment of children is within the realm of 
creditable speculation.  A short thought experiment from American history 
explains why.  The Nineteenth Amendment, adopted in 1920, protects American 
citizens from denial or abridgment of the right to vote “on account of sex.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIX; Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1631, 1645 (2009).  Consider whether it would ever occur to a 
twenty-first-century government official to deny women the opportunity to vote 
in American elections.  See Dorf, supra, at 1633 (opining that the Nineteenth 
Amendment “was so successful that it has arguably become unnecessary”). 
 217. There is a nascent, but growing, literature empirically verifying law’s 
norm-creating impacts.  See, e.g., Patricia Funk, Is There an Expressive 
Function of Law?  An Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines, 9 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 135, 135, 146–56 (2007) (determining that Swiss voting-
duty laws positively affect voting behavior even though fines for violation verge 
on de minimis).  For anecdotal evidence of these impacts, see Geisinger, supra 
note 208, at 64, 68–69 (reporting the expressive effects of seatbelt laws, car 
seats for children, and helmet laws for motorbike riders).  But see Matthew A. 
Christiansen, A Great Schism: Social Norms and Marijuana Prohibition, 4 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 229, 239–40 (2010) (stating that the expressive function 
of laws prohibiting marijuana has not succeeded in altering public acceptance of 
marijuana use). 
 218. States with Full Abolition, GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO END ALL CORPORAL 
PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN, http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/pages/ 
frame.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2012) [hereinafter GLOBAL INITIATIVE, States] 
(follow “Global progress,” then “States with full abolition”) (relating that the 
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bans are usually ensconced in national civil codes, though 
prosecution for violating the bans is usually also a possibility 
under each jurisdiction’s penal code.219  Prosecution is 
extremely rare, however, with respect to parental corporal 
punishment that falls short of traditional physical child 
abuse.220  The abolitionist countries have instead opted to rely 
upon the pedagogical impacts of these antispanking legal 
regimes.221  To the extent studies or other assessments have 
been undertaken to evaluate such impacts, they 
preponderantly show that the laws have generated both 
attitudes against and a lower rate of incidence of corporal 
punishment of children.222
 
following countries have banned all corporal punishment of children: Republic 
of Congo (2010), Albania (2010), Togo (2007), Republic of Moldova (2008), Spain 
(2007), Portugal (2007), Netherlands (2007), Luxembourg (2008), Costa Rica 
(2008), Venezuela (2007), New Zealand (2007), Poland (2010), Uruguay (2007), 
South Sudan (2011), Greece (2006), Hungary (2005), Kenya (2010), Tunisia 
(2010), Liechtenstein (2008), Romania (2004), Ukraine (2004), Iceland (2003), 
Germany (2000), Israel (2000), Bulgaria (2000), Croatia (1999), Latvia (1998), 
Denmark (1997), Cyprus (1994), Austria (1989), Norway (1987), Finland (1983), 
and Sweden (1979)). 
 
 219. See GLOBAL INITIATIVE, States, supra note 218; BITENSKY, CORPORAL 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, passim. 
 220. See Legislative Measures to Prohibit Corporal Punishment, GLOBAL 
INITIATIVE TO END ALL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN, 
http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/pages/frame.html (last visited Oct. 26, 
2012) [hereinafter GLOBAL INITIATIVE, Legislative Measures] (follow “Reform,” 
then “Legislative measures to prohibit corporal punishment”); BITENSKY, 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 156, 175, 182–83, 192–93, 210. 
 221. See BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 156, 172, 183, 
192. 
 222. See, e.g., KAI-D. BUSSMANN, CLAUDIA ERTHAL & ANDREAS SCHROTH, 
THE EFFECT OF BANNING CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN EUROPE: A FIVE-NATION 
COMPARISON 20–21 (2009), available at http://www.endcorporalpunish 
ment.org/pages/pdfs/reports/Bussman%20%20Europe%205%20nation%20report
%202009.pdf (concluding that prohibiting corporal punishment of children by 
law leads to less use of physical punishment in childrearing, as indicated by 
trends in Sweden, Germany, and Austria); Enrique Gracia & Juan Herrero, Is It 
Considered Violence?  The Acceptability of Physical Punishment of Children in 
Europe, 70 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 210, 214–16 (2008) (finding that, within those 
European Union countries that had banned corporal punishment of children, 
the bans were “significantly associated with lower levels of acceptability of 
physical punishment of children”); Joan E. Durrant, Legal Reform and Attitudes 
Toward Physical Punishment in Sweden, 11 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 147, 148–52, 
161 (2003) (ascertaining that Sweden’s ban on corporal punishment of children 
has helped to shift popular attitudes toward disapproval of the punishment); 
Tom Sullivan, In 30 Years Without Spanking, Are Swedish Children Better 
Behaved?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.cs 
monitor.com/World/Europe/2009/1005/p06s10-woeu.html (reporting that, 
“according to official figures, just 10 percent of Swedish children are spanked  
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That the punishment is entrenched in the United 
States223 should not undermine the long-term pedagogical 
effectiveness of a Thirteenth Amendment ban on it.  Some of 
the thirty-three countries that have instituted national bans 
on corporal punishment of children did so in cultures that 
were steeped in child rearing via the rod.224  In any event, if 
addictive habits are vulnerable to law’s pedagogy, then 
nonaddictive corporal punishment should be too.  Cigarette 
smoking was once fashionable and widespread in the United 
States;225 it is also exceedingly addictive.226  Antismoking 
ordinances’ pedagogical force nevertheless appears to have 
helped discourage many people from lighting up.227
2. Preventing or Redressing Corporal Punishment of 
Children: Possible  Bases for a Cause of Action 
Against Violators of Section 1’s Implied 
Prohibition on the Punishment 
 
The Civil Rights Cases posited early on that Section 1 of 
the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing.228  That 
characterization has been understood to mean, at a 
minimum, that Section 1 can be asserted in court as a defense 
without the aid of ancillary enforcement legislation.229
 
. . . by their parents today [in 2009],” but that “[m]ore than 90 percent of 
Swedish children were smacked prior to the ban”).  
  
 223. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 224. See, e.g., BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 154 
(conveying that Sweden had a history of harsh physical punishment of children 
when the 1979 ban on corporal punishment of children was legislated); GLOBAL 
INITIATIVE, Legislative Measures, supra note 220 (click on “Implementation of 
prohibition in the home and other settings”) (chronicling the history of Maori 
reliance on physical punishment of their children up to and after enactment of 
New Zealand’s ban on the punishment). 
 225. Cigarette Consumption, United States, 1900–2007, INFOPLEASE (2007), 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0908700.html (taking data from Tobacco 
Outlook Report, Econ. Research Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric.). 
 226. Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products, NIDA, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH 
(Aug. 2010), http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/cigarettes-other-
tobacco-products. 
 227. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nndges [sic] vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky 
Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 628 (2000).  
 228. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
 229. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 925 n.1 (3d ed. 
2000) (averring that “[e]ach of the Civil War Amendments . . . is ‘self-executing’ 
in at least the minimal sense that it may be invoked defensively, to oppose the 
application of a rule of law adverse to a party in a lawsuit on the ground that 
the rule of law . . . violates the constitutional provision in question”). 
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Whether the proposition also signifies that, sans legislation, 
Section 1 tacitly authorizes a cause of action for legal or 
equitable redress of Section 1 violations is another matter.  
The Supreme Court has never purposefully or explicitly taken 
a position on this, and the federal circuits are at loggerheads 
on how to resolve the dilemma; the question therefore 
remains unsettled.230
The lack of judicial resolution has engendered perplexity 
among legal scholars as to the potency of a self-executing 
Section 1.  Professor Laurence Tribe has opined that “[i]t 
seems doubtful” that the Civil Rights Cases provide enough of 
a legal basis for Section 1 to be self-executing in the “more 
aggressive sense—that it supplies its own sword as well as 
serving as a shield.”
 
231  However, a persevering band of 
skeptics, seeing the glint of a sword in Section 1, maintain 
that the provision should or even must be read as 
affirmatively self-executing, at least in some contexts.232
 
 230. Carter, supra note 104, at 1314 n.6; cf. Hila Keren, “We Insist! Freedom 
Now”: Does Contract Doctrine Have Anything Constitutional to Say?, 11 MICH. 
J. RACE & L. 133, 144–45 (2005) (observing that “the ability of a private person 
to bring a cause of action that is based directly and independently on the 
[Thirteenth] Amendment has not been established”); see also McKee, supra note 
79, at 178 (asserting that “[t]here is no consensus among the judicial circuits 
that a private cause of action exists under the Thirteenth Amendment”); 
Vanessa B.M. Vergara, Comment, Abusive Mail-Order Bride Marriage and the 
Thirteenth Amendment, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1577 n.194 (2000) (same). 
  
 231. 1 TRIBE, supra note 229, at 925 n.1; see also Lauren Kares, Note, The 
Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional Amendment in Search of a Doctrine, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 372, 380 (1995); cf. Lea VanderVelde, The Thirteenth 
Amendment of our Aspirations, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 855, 857 (2007) (declaring 
that “[a]lthough the drafters may have intended the [Thirteenth] Amendment 
as self-executing, 140 years of history indicates that this expectation was naïve” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 232. See, e.g., Larry J. Pittman, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Dark Ward: 
The Intersection of the Thirteenth Amendment and Health Care Treatments 
Having Disproportionate Impacts on Disfavored Groups, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 
774, 852–56 (1998) (arguing that a “direct” cause of action should flow from 
Section 1 for damages to remediate racial discrimination constituting badges 
and incidents of slavery); Tsesis, supra note 190, at 344 n.199 (stating that 
constriction of Section 1’s scope so as to exclude independent causes of action is 
not a necessary outcome);  Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment 
and Slavery in the Global Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 980 n.30 (2002) 
(opining that “some remedy is available” against private actors violating Section 
1); Jeffrey E. Zinsmeister, Comment, In Rem Actions Under U.S. Admiralty 
Jurisdiction as an Effective Means of Obtaining Thirteenth Amendment Relief to 
Combat Modern Slavery, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1249, 1260, 1281–83 (2005) 
(contending that an independent in rem private right of action should exist 
under the Thirteenth Amendment for relief in admiralty courts against the 
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Professor Larry Pittman summons two Supreme Court 
precedents as ballast for upgrading Section 1 to this more 
aggressive posture,233 i.e., Palmer v. Thompson234 and City of 
Memphis v. Greene.235  He points out that in both cases 
plaintiffs stated a cause of action directly under Section 1, 
and that in both the Court decided the Section 1 causes on 
the merits.236  In Palmer, the Court, apparently assuming 
that a Thirteenth Amendment cause of action was properly 
brought, rejected plaintiffs’ contention that a city’s closure of 
its public swimming pools, in lieu of operating them on a 
desegregated basis, constituted a violation of the 
Amendment.237  In Greene, the Court again proceeded as if 
plaintiffs had properly brought a cause of action under 
Section 1, and held that a city’s blocking off one end of a two-
lane street traversing a white residential community did not 
pose a violation of the Amendment.  In neither case did the 
Court specifically acknowledge that Section 1 is affirmatively 
self-executing,238
Some Thirteenth Amendment mavens occasionally 
appear to lose patience with a schema that would deny 
Section 1 an endogenous cause of action for its own judicial 
enforcement.
 but the Justices’ actions could be taken to 
‘speak louder’ than their silences. 
239  Their exasperation may be symptomatic of an 
acute intuition as to which side of the self-executing debate is 
most idoneous—Section 1 as shield only or as both shield and 
sword.  Long-term unenforceability may, after all, reduce a 
constitutional provision to a casualty of desuetude.240
 
modern slave trade). 
  Chief 
 233. Pittman, supra note 232, at 853 & n.298. 
 234. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
 235. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981). 
 236. Pittman, supra note 232, at 853. 
 237. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 226–27. 
 238. See Green, 451 U.S. at 128–29.  For some additional cases enforcing 
federal constitutional provisions without referencing a statutory cause of action, 
see Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), and Ex parte Young, 209 
U.S. 123 (1908). 
 239. See Pittman, supra note 232, at 860 (concluding that “[t]o maximize the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s utility in achieving the free exercise of all Americans’ 
natural rights to ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’ including the 
opportunities to work, learn, live, and otherwise share in the liberties and 
benefits which white Americans freely partake, courts should recognize 
explicitly a direct claim under the Thirteenth Amendment” (citation omitted)). 
 240. Cf. Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 290–92, (1995) (questioning why the judiciary should not 
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Justice John Marshall warned long ago that “we must never 
forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”241
The hermeneutic admonition is poignantly relevant to 
the self-execution issue when cojoined with the Chief Justice’s 
political critique of rights without remedies: “The very 
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he 
receives an injury.  One of the first duties of government is to 
afford that protection.”
  
Presumably it would be just such an ill-advised “forgetting” to 
allow parts of the nation’s founding document to sink into 
oblivion for all practical purposes. 
242
In response, Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics
  Though he articulated these 
overarching insights in decisions unconnected to Section 1 or 
the self-execution of constitutional rights, it is hard to 
perceive why fundamental principles of this ilk should not 
govern the Thirteenth Amendment as well.  And, if they do, 
what does that signify for the Section 1 conundrum of sword 
versus shield? 
243 gives a tepid vote for the sword.  The 
Bivens Court held that, in light of the applicability of general 
federal question jurisdiction, petitioner had stated a cause of 
action under the Fourth Amendment for damages where 
federal agents, acting under color of their authority, had 
made a warrantless entry into and search of his apartment 
and had arrested him on narcotics charges, all without 
probable cause.244  Bivens, it should be noted, exhibits a 
puzzling conflation of causes of action with remedies.245  That 
is, at the time Bivens was handed down, federal courts had 
long been adjudicating upon the presumption that the general 
federal question statute246
 
be able to enforce the Constitution on its own when the Constitution is a prime 
protection of individuals against encroachments by government). 
 alone invested them with the 
power to order injunctive relief for constitutional wrongs, 
 241. M’Culloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). 
 242. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
 243. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
 244. Id. at 389–90, 397. 
 245. Bandes, supra note 240, at 301–02; Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and 
Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1542–43 (1972). 
 246. The general federal question statute provides: “The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2011). 
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though that statute is mute on types of remedy.247
If this was all there was to Bivens, it would appear that 
the way had been cleared for victims to state a cause of action 
seeking damages (or, as before Bivens, equitable intervention) 
for federal governmental actors’ unconstitutional corporal 
punishment of children.
 
248  Bivens actions, however, are 
subject to formidable defenses;249 worse still for corporal 
punishment plaintiffs, Bivens contains internally-imposed 
constraints on its broader applicability.250  And, the decision 
has spawned cases more enamored of expanding the 
constraints on, than of perpetuating Bivens’ empowerment of, 
the judiciary.251
 
 247. Bandes, supra note 240, at 301; Marsha S. Berzon, Securing Fragile 
Foundations: Affirmative Constitutional Adjudication in Federal Courts, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 711–12 (2009). 
 
 248. Cf. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1380 (specifying Bivens as a 
basis for stating a Thirteenth Amendment cause of action to redress physical 
child abuse). 
 249. See Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled 
Promise, 67 N.C. L. REV. 337, 348–57 (1989) (discussing the qualified immunity 
defense as ubiquitously raised in Bivens actions); John E. Nordin II, The 
Constitutiional Liability of Federal Employees: Bivens Claims, 41 FED. B. NEWS 
& J. 342, 345–46 (1994) (summarizing principles of the qualified immunity 
defense to Bivens actions). 
 250. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 396 (1971) (qualifying the holding with such caveats as that the “present 
case involves no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress,” and that “[w]e are not dealing with a question 
of ‘federal fiscal policy’ ” ); Bandes, supra note 240, at 337–38; Pittman, supra 
note 232, at 855; Rosen, supra note 249, at 359, 369. 
 251. See Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional 
Wrongs Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 
63–72 (2006/2007). 
     An example of subsequent cases radically reining in Bivens is Wilkie v. 
Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549–54 (2007), in which the Court held that whether a 
Bivens action may be maintained requires courts to first determine whether any 
alternative process exists for protecting plaintiff’s interest such that the 
alternative constitutes “a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain 
from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages.”  Id. at 550.  In 
Wilkie, the Court concluded that the “the forums of defense and redress open to 
[respondent] Robbins are . . . an assemblage of state and federal, administrative 
and judicial benches applying regulations, statutes and common law rules.”  Id. 
at 554.  The Court ruled that the presence of this “assemblage,” under the facts 
of the case, was not dispositive concerning whether a Bivens cause of action was 
justified.  Id.  See John F. Preis, Alternative State Remedies in Constitutional 
Torts, 40 CONN. L. REV. 723, 725–26 (2008) (analyzing Wilkie as standing for the 
proposition that plaintiffs may not successfully state Bivens causes of action if 
state law provides a means of recourse). 
     Wilkie is troubling as precedent because the victims of constitutional torts 
are often apt to find state law alternatives for redress to be inherently 
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the 
variety and intricacy of such defenses and limitations other 
than to remark their existence.  Suffice it to say that they 
exist and that they could make Bivens problematic authority 
for litigating against federal officials for their 
unconstitutional corporal punishment of children when 
damages are sought.  This thicket of complications may, 
moreover, be made still more impassable for plaintiffs by the 
fact that the Court has never ruled on whether Bivens will 
support a cause of action for Thirteenth Amendment 
violations.252
Bivens actions, of course, may only be brought against 
defendants who are federal employees.  But, what if corporal 
punishment of children, in violation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, is carried out by a state employee or by a person 
acting on behalf of the state?  This is a much more likely 
scenario since public school teachers and administrators are 
usually employees of a state government or of its 
subdivisions.
 
253  To state a cause of action against one of these 
defendants for paddling their young charges, plaintiffs could 
find that Section 1983254
Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part: 
 is a tenable substitute for Bivens. 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
 
inadequate though the inadequacy may not necessarily be perceived or, if 
perceived, deemed significant by the Court. 
 252. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation 
and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 
822–24 (2010) (tracing the extent of the Supreme Court’s application of Bivens 
to the various Amendments, exclusive of the Thirteenth Amendment); Baher 
Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a 
Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 983, 986–87 
(2002) (criticizing the unenforceability of Thirteenth Amendment protections 
and urging that Bivens should apply to make the Amendment directly 
enforceable in court). 
 253. Are Teachers Considered Government Employees?, ASK.COM, 
http://www.ask.com/web?q=Are+Teachers+Considered+Government+Employees
%3F&o=1567&l=sem&qsrc=3053 (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).  
 254. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011). 
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proceeding for redress . . . .255
The statute, on its face, allows a cause of action only 
against persons who, in contravening the Constitution or 
other federal laws, act “under color of state law.
 
256  There is 
more to this phraseology than meets the eye.  Judicial 
interpretation has established four fact patterns where a 
person is said to act under color of state law.  They are: (1) 
when the challenged acts are committed by a person who is a 
state’s designated agent or officer, and, in performing the act, 
the person does not act in a private capacity;257 (2) when the 
person, in committing the challenged conduct, exercises 
powers and functions typically exercised by state 
government;258 (3) when the person is coerced or appreciably 
encouraged by the state to engage in the challenged conduct 
so as to fairly appear to act on behalf of the state;259 and, (4) 
when there is a nexus between the person’s challenged 
conduct and the state, close enough for the conduct to be 
considered that of the state.260
Though the multiplicity of fact patterns indicates that it 
can be no exotic thing for a person to act under color of state 
law, it is still rather more the case that the fact patterns end 
up shrinking the pool of potential defendants for Section 1983 
litigation.  Consider that, if an adult corporally punished a 
child in defiance of a Section 1 ban on the punishment, the 
victim would not have a cause of action under Section 1983 
against the adult if the latter was a private person doing the 
punishing in his or her private capacity, was a federal official 
administering the punishment in a private or federal 
governmental capacity, or was even a state or municipal 
employee
 
261
 
 255. Id. 
 punishing the child so as not to fit any of the four 
 256. Id. 
 257. See Richard B. Gallagher et al., Post-Civil War Federal Civil Rights 
Acts: Civil Provisions: Statute Creating Right of Action for Deprivation of 
Federal Rights Under Color of State Law (42 U.S.C. § 1983): Action “Under 
Color of” State Law, Custom, or Usage: In General, 15 AM. JUR. 2d CIVIL RIGHTS 
§ 72 (2011). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. It should be noted that while municipalities and their employees are 
considered “persons” as per Section 1983, it is forbidden to use Section 1983 in 
an attempt to hold a municipality liable under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior.  Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through § 1983, 
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fact patterns. 
Furthermore, once a legally acceptable person is named 
as defendant, other obstacles may still foreclose a favorable 
judgment for the Section 1983 plaintiff.  From among a 
stockpile of circumventive legal devices, the enterprising 
defendant may raise counteracting doctrines immanent to 
Section 1983 law,262 or he or she may seek cover behind 
sovereign immunity263 and other independent defenses.264
While Bivens and Section 1983 actions are bristling with 
such limitations on litigious victims of constitutional torts,
 
265 
these actions do still and all, provide some real avenues for 
obtaining judicial redress.266
 
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1459–62 (2009). 
  However, as previously 
 262. See Jacob E. Meyer, “Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings”: The Procedural 
Nature of Comprehensive-Remedial-Scheme Preclusion in § 1983 Claims, 42 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 415, 422 (2009) (enumerating several limitations on 
Section 1983 actions springing from the body of law developed in interpreting 
the statute, including, for instance, that if a claimant asserted violation of a 
federal statute containing a comprehensive remedial scheme, then a Section 
1983 action seeking redress would be foreclosed). 
 263. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Congress Needs to Repair the Court’s Damage to § 
1983, 16 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 29, 34, 38 (2010); Meyer, supra note 262, at 421; 
Martin A. Schwartz, Supreme Court § 1983 Decisions—October 2008 Term, 45 
TULSA L. REV. 231, 231, 261 (2009). 
 264. See Meyer, supra note 262, at 421 (enumerating defenses to Section 
1983 actions, including “issue and claim preclusion” and “statutory 
requirements such as the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion 
requirement”). 
 265. See supra notes 262–64 and accompanying text. 
 266. The Amar/Widawsky article conceives of Bivens and Section 1983 as 
vehicles for procuring redress on a grand scale for acts of physical child abuse 
that have been deconstitutionalized under the Thirteenth Amendment.  Amar & 
Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1379–82.  Specifically, the article proposes using 
the statute not only to sue governmental officers who physically abuse children, 
but of also deploying it to state a cause of action against officers when they fail, 
by inaction, to prevent the abuse perpetrated by private actors.  The article 
elaborates that  
the absence of a state action requirement in the Thirteenth 
Amendment means not only that certain private action is banned, but 
also that certain state inaction is prohibited.  The two points are closely 
linked: precisely because the [Thirteenth] Amendment imposes a legal 
duty on private [slave]masters, it simultaneously requires the state to 
enforce that legal duty.   
Id. at 1381; see Katyal, supra note 186, at 796 (arguing that under the 
Thirteenth Amendment the government is bound to eliminate forced 
prostitution). 
     There is no reason why this analysis should not equally apply to corporal 
punishment of children once the punishment is deconstitutionalized under the 
Thirteenth Amendment. 
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mentioned, the incipient plaintiff may find that neither 
Bivens nor Section 1983 is an option if the tortfeasor is a 
person in the private sector and acting in a purely private 
capacity.  This easily could be the predicament for children 
who are corporally punished, in violation of Section 1 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, by a parent or other family relative, 
babysitter, nanny, etc.  If the Court was to recognize the 
protection of children from the punishment under Section 1, 
would our legal system leave them in the lurch to “enjoy” a 
constitutional right without a remedy? 
The answer is mixed.  Plaintiffs might well be able to rest 
a cause of action on appropriate state common law.  In fact, 
an action should lie on this ground regardless of whether the 
defendant is a private individual, or a state, local, or federal 
governmental actor.267  To illustrate, a child aggrieved by 
unconstitutional corporal punishment at the hands of one of 
these types of perpetrators, could plausibly bring a cause of 
action in trespass or wrongful imprisonment for retrospective 
damages, if state law provided the opportunity.268
But, even if the opportunity for state common law redress 
exists and even if the child victim of unconstitutional corporal 
punishment obtains a judgment awarding such redress, the 
award may well be strikingly deficient as compared to the 
grant of relief in a Bivens or Section 1983 action.  One reason 
for the deficit is that suits founded on state common law 
would only incidentally address harms associated with 
slavery or with its inferred subset of corporal punishment of 
children.
  If state law 
did not so provide and if the perpetrator could not be sued 
under Bivens or Section 1983, it would be down the rabbit 
hole for plaintiff—unenforceable rights in tow. 
269
 
 267. See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 24, at 1380 (listing some of the state 
common law remedies that historically were available to enslaved persons 
against their masters and that could be sought by victims of physical child 
abuse through litigation). 
  The problem arises from the expressive gravitas 
of the Constitution and especially of the Thirteenth 
Amendment as perhaps the document’s most sublime homage 
 268. See id. at 80–82. 
 269. Azmy, supra note 252, at 1035–36; cf. James J. Park, The Constitutional 
Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 442 (2003) 
(arguing that state common law redress for constitutional torts is insufficient to 
create “norms that regulate the government’s discretion to inflict harm on 
individuals”). 
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to human freedom and dignity.270  No matter how generous or 
accommodating, state common law remedies cannot convey 
the full extent of that constitutional ethos.271  A second reason 
for reservations about state common law disposition of 
corporal punishment infringements of the Amendment is that 
this approach may undermine one of the Amendment’s 
central missions, i.e., “to create a federal liberty interest 
independent of state law protection.”272
Considered in overview, then, a variegated though patchy 
framework emerges for stating causes of action against those 
who would flout a Thirteenth Amendment prohibition on 
corporal punishment of children.  Given the many 
complications and contingencies involved in mounting such 
cases, it would be a fool’s errand to try to predict the viability 
or success of adjudicating Thirteenth Amendment objections 
to corporal punishment of children after (or, if) the Court 
recognizes the punishment as akin to slavery.  The many 
obstacles to this type of litigation are in need of some serious 
and unstinting dismantling.  Indeed, “[r]emember the 
Thirteenth” was penned with no little apprehensiveness for 
its future robustness
 
273
3. A Preference for Preventing Parental Corporal 
Punishment Through a Legal Prohibition’s 
Pedogogical Function 
—a robustness that depends upon 
continuing to extend the Amendment’s protections to society’s 
most vulnerable members. 
As a general matter, when it comes to the scourging of 
children’s bodies, averting the maltreatment altogether 
should be a priority.  The specter of civil or criminal liability 
can and should function preventatively through a deterrent 
impact.274
Adversarial court proceedings pitting children against 
parents, with the former as real parties in interest
  However, the parent as corporal punisher raises 
unique considerations that may counsel against litigation. 
275
 
 270. See Azmy, supra note 252, at 1035–36. 
 in civil 
 271. Id.  
 272. Id. at 1036. 
 273. Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 403, 
403, 408 (1993). 
 274. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 275. Typically, when a child desires to sue his or her parents, any person 
with an interest in the child’s welfare may serve as “next friend” or guardian ad 
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suits or as witnesses in civil or criminal suits, may have 
unintended negative consequences for the parent-child 
relationship.276  Moreover, the prospect of assuming such 
roles could dissuade children from seeking the intercession of 
the legal system in the first place.277  On the other side of the 
generational divide, these sorts of suits could cause some 
parents, paradoxically, to become less receptive to 
internalizing and owning the ban’s message.278
II. THESIS UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 
  
Consequently, as between the two approaches for 
implementing a Section 1 ban on corporal punishment of 
children, this Article favors relying upon the preventative 
pedagogical force of the ban in relation to potential parental 
violators. 
A. Section 2 Should be Interpreted as Empowering Congress 
to Enact a Ban on Corporal Punishment of Children 
It will be recalled that Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment vests Congress with the power to enforce the 
Amendment by enacting legislation.279  Congress is 
authorized to exercise its Section 2 authority on behalf of any 
racial280 or age group,281
 
litem vis-à-vis the litigation.  Howard A. Davidson, The Child’s Right to Be 
Heard and Represented in Judicial Proceedings, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 255, 258 
(1991). 
 and against both governmental and 
 276. Dean M. Herman, A Statutory Proposal to Prohibit the Infliction of 
Violence upon Children, 19 FAM. L.Q. 1, 18–21, 44 (1985); see Bitensky, supra 
note 171, at 447 (suggesting that a child’s civil suit against his or her parent 
puts the former in an adversarial role that may not be emotionally viable for the 
child); cf. Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal 
System Should Do for Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 
237, 292–93, 296 (1999) (positing that, although children who have seen or 
undergone domestic physical violence may find testifying in court to be 
therapeutic, the experience “can be incredibly stressful for some children”); 
Rachel L. Melissa, Comment, Oregon’s Response to the Impact of Domestic 
Violence on Children, 82 OR. L. REV. 1125, 1139–43 (2003) (observing that, in 
spite of a division among researchers over the effect of testifying as a witness on 
children, it may be emotionally harmful for the child witness if he or she has 
seen domestic violence and is asked to testify against its perpetrator). 
 277. Bitensky, supra note 171, at 447. 
 278. I have no evidence to support this statement.  It is surmise based on 
logic and common sense. 
 279. U.S. CONST.  amend. XIII, § 2. 
 280. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287–88, 295–96 
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private sector actors,282
The first theoretical construct endowing Congress with 
discretion to legislate a ban on the punishment is based on 
portions of the analysis previously provided by this Article.  
Part I establishes that the Supreme Court has subsumed 
within Section 1’s prohibition of slavery a prohibition on 
conditions closely akin to slavery;
 meaning that Section 2 legislation can 
cover everyone who conceivably could be a corporally 
punished child or a corporal punisher.  However, it does not 
axiomatically follow from these precepts that Congress also 
has the power under Section 2 to prohibit the activity of 
corporally punishing children.  Further legal argumentation 
is needed to make that case.  This Article maintains that 
under either of two theoretical constructs, Congress can rely 
on Section 2 to pass a nationwide ban against all corporal 
punishment of children, in conjunction with or as disjunctive 
to having the Court recognize an implied ban in Section 1. 
283 and, Part I also 
demonstrates that corporal punishment consigns children, at 
least for the duration of the punishment, to such a 
condition.284  The conclusion necessarily ensues that, if 
Congress has the prerogative to enact proscriptions on and 
means of recourse against slavery (which it indubitably 
does285), then Congress must have the power to enact a ban on 
corporal punishment of children.286
 
(1976); Carter, supra note 104, at 1358; John B. Attanasio, The Constitutionality 
of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering: Where Procreative Liberty and Equal 
Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1274, 1309 n.182 (1986). 
 
 281. See Amar, supra note 273, at 404 (pointing out that at least one 
congressional enactment pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment was 
“quintessentially about children”); Michael H. LeRoy, Compulsory Labor in a 
National Emergency: Public Service or Involuntary Servitude?  The Case of 
Crippled Ports, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 331, 356 (2007). 
 282. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438–39 (1968). 
 283. See supra Part I.A. 
 284. See supra notes 108–75 and accompanying text. 
 285. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105; see Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1818–19 (2010) (asserting that the Thirteenth 
Amendment gives Congress the power “not only to prevent slavery but to 
establish freedom”); cf. John Harrison, State Sovereign Immunity and 
Congress’s Enforcement Powers, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 353, 363 (2006) (declaring 
that Congress’ power under the Thirteenth Amendment encompasses legislative 
enforcement of the Amendment’s Section 1 guarantees). 
 286. See Balkin, supra note 285, at 1818–19; Dina Mishra, Child Labor as 
Involuntary Servitude: The Failure of Congress to Legislate Against Child Labor 
Pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment in the Early Twentieth Century, 63 
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The workings of the second construct entail a more 
involved explanation.  The Court has repeatedly held that 
Section 2 provides Congress with the latitude to legislate 
against “the badges and incidents of slavery.”287  This is a 
conceptually separate Section 2 power from that discussed 
above because the interactions coming within Congress’ 
crosshairs under this theory need not be actual slavery or 
even closely akin to slavery.288  That distinction partially 
clarifies what “badges and incidents of slavery” do not have to 
be; but it also leaves quite unclear what they are.  Having 
offered this cryptic trope, the Court has gone on to variously 
describe the “badges and incidents of slavery” as the “relic[s] 
of slavery,”289 the “burdens and disabilities” of slavery,290 and 
the “inseparable incident[s]” of slavery291
 
 which existed in the 
antebellum South.  Substituting nebulous synonyms for the 
original nebulous metaphor did not, however, add much to 
our understanding. 
 
RUTGERS L. REV. 59, 63–72 (2010) (making the case for Congress, via Section 2 
of the Thirteenth Amendment, to regulate child labor); Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105 
(observing that “surely there has never been any doubt of the power of Congress 
to impose liability on private persons under § 2 of [the Thirteenth] amendment  
. . . . Not only may Congress impose such liability, but the varieties of private 
conduct that it may make criminally punishable or civilly remediable extend far 
beyond the actual imposition of slavery or involuntary servitude” (emphasis 
added)). 
 287. E.g., City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125 & n.39 (1981) (citing 
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)); Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105; Jones, 
392 U.S. at 439. 
     Some commentators and lower courts have turned this holding about 
Congress’ Section 2 power on its head by deriving from it a negative inference, 
i.e., that if Congress has the power to forbid or regulate badges and incidents of 
slavery under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, then courts are confined 
to adjudicating actual enslavement or involuntary servitude, and nothing else, 
under Section 1.  Carter, supra note 104, at 1340.  However, the Supreme Court 
has never taken this position.  Id. at 1342. 
 288. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 440–44 (holding that a statute, enacted pursuant 
to Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, validly barred private and public 
racial discrimination in sale and rental of property); Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105 
(holding that Congress legislated within the scope of its Section 2 discretion, 
under the Thirteenth Amendment, in creating a cause of action for Black 
citizens who were “victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private 
action aimed at depriving them of the basic rights that the law secures to all 
free men”). 
 289. Jones, 392 U.S. at 441–43. 
 290. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22; Jones, 392 U.S. at 44l. 
 291. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 38 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting), 
overruled in part by Jones, 392 U.S. 409. 
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The Court basically punted on this issue to Congress, 
setting in motion a circular process by which legislators 
would decide what contemporary practices constitute “badges 
and incidents of slavery” under Section 2,292 but any needed 
review of legislators’ decisions would land the matter back 
before the judiciary.  The Court accorded Congress extensive 
leeway in making the initial decision, i.e., as long as the 
lawmakers’ decision was rational, judges should not disturb 
it.293  The process has yielded legislation, some of which has 
been challenged as beyond Congress’ Section 2 powers.294  It 
is in reacting to those legislative templates that the Court 
found its way to providing “badges and incidents of slavery” 
with some intelligible, albeit fragmented, substance.295
Thus, the Court has found that “badges and incidents of 
slavery” includes racial discrimination in the sale or rental of 
property,
 
296 curtailment or denial of freedom of interstate 
movement,297 and abridgement of the right to enter into and 
enforce contracts.298  Moreover and perhaps more 
importantly, these decisions tell us something valuable about 
how Congress should go about its Section 2 business.299
 
 292. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439–40. 
  They 
illustrate the Court’s methodologies, which are still good law, 
with respect to determining the specific content of “badges 
 293. Id. at 440–41. 
 294. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976) (upholding, under 
Section 2, a statute proscribing racial discrimination in the making and 
enforcement of contracts); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104–06 (1971) 
(upholding, under Section 2, a statute protecting the right to engage in 
interstate travel); Jones, 392 U.S. at 439–44 (upholding, under Section 2, a 
statute barring race discrimination in the sale and rental of property). 
 295. See infra notes 296–98 and accompanying text. 
 296. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439–44. 
 297. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 104–06. 
 298. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 179. 
 299. Legal scholars have suggested a wealth of possible methodologies by 
which Congress could give content to “badges and incidents of slavery.”  See, 
e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided?  Some New 
Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 451, 508 (2007) (proposing that, in defining “badges 
and incidents of slavery,” Congress should balance the commitment to liberty 
and property against the commitment to eliminate vestiges of slavery); Tsesis, 
supra note 190, at 367–68 (theorizing that Congress should interpret ‘badges 
and incidents of slavery’ to encompass an arbitrary denial of each person’s 
opportunity to lead a meaningful life); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-
Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255, 268 (2010) 
(declaring that Congress should understand “badges and incidents of slavery” as 
an anti-subordination promise). 
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and incidents of slavery.”300
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. is emblematic.  In Jones, the 
Court adopted a technique of historical inquiry as to whether 
the statutorily banned practice, i.e., in that case, twentieth-
century racial discrimination in property transactions, had 
also figured into the everyday lives of southern slaves;
 
301 it 
was only after the inquiry revealed that the practice had been 
a quotidian of slave life that the Court held that the statute 
concerned badges and incidents of slavery and was therefore 
a constitutional exercise of Section 2 power.302
Another technique, proffered as a dictum in the Civil 
Rights Cases
 
303 and cursorily noted in Jones,304 is prominently 
on display in Griffin v. Breckenridge.  The Griffin Court 
focused on whether an objective of challenged Section 2 
legislation is to dismantle restraints upon “basic rights that 
the law secures to all free men.”305  The statute in issue 
protected the fundamental constitutional right to travel 
interstate,306 a right that the Court also characterized as 
preserving human freedom.307  Based primarily on this 
human freedom aspect of the right, the Court upheld the 
statute as within the scope of Section 2.308
 
 300. See infra notes 301–08 and accompanying text. 
  While Griffin’s 
 301. Jones 392 U.S. at 440–43; see Carter, supra note 104, at 1366. 
 302. Jones, 392 U.S. at 443–44; Colbert, supra note 102, at 3–4, 30. 
 303. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (averring that, though the 
Court was not deciding whether the Thirteenth Amendment alone could support 
the challenged legislation, Congress had assumed it had the power to “declare 
and vindicate those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of 
citizenship, and the enjoyment or deprivation of which constitutes the essential 
distinction between freedom and slavery”). 
 304. Jones, 392 U.S. at 441 (stating that “the badges and incidents of slavery 
. . . included restraints upon ‘those fundamental rights which are the essence of 
civil freedom’ ” ) (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22). 
 305. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971).  For a similar reading 
of Jones, see Charles H. Jones, Jr., An Argument for Federal Protection Against 
Racially Motivated Crimes: 18 U.S.C. § 241 and the Thirteenth Amendment, 21 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 689, 733–35 (1986). 
 306. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105–06. 
 307. Id.; John Valery White, Vindicating Rights in a Federal System: 
Rediscovering 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)’s Equality Right, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 145, 192 
n.164 (1996). 
 308. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105–07; Federal Remedy to Redress Private 
Deprivations of Civil Rights, 85 HARV. L. REV. 95, 101–02 (1971).  But see Linda 
E. Fisher, Anatomy of an Affirmative Duty to Protest: 42 U.S.C. Section 1986, 56 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 461, 478 (1999) (asserting that the right to interstate 
travel rests, in part, on the Thirteenth Amendment).  It should be clarified that 
the Griffin Court did not equate the “basic rights that the law secures to all free 
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invocation of “freedom rights” opens the barn door wide 
enough under Section 2 to let through a sizeable legislative 
cavalry, this Article resists the temptation to gamble on such 
rights.  Though Griffin was decided more than forty years 
ago, the Court has not further developed or defined 
Thirteenth Amendment freedom rights,309
In lieu thereof, this Article turns to Jones’ historical-
inquiry methodology for ascertaining what badges and 
incidents of slavery are,
 making them an 
unpredictable and flimsy source of support. 
310 and ascertains that the 
methodology wholly supports congressional discretion under 
Section 2 to enact a ban on corporal punishment of children.  
This Article has already expatiated, in relation to Section 1, 
upon the fact that legalized corporal punishment of slaves, 
adult and juvenile, was the norm in the antebellum South.311  
It bears restating, now for purposes of Section 2, that it was a 
customary, really a humdrum affair, for slaveholders to hit, 
whip, and flog their human “chattel:”312
 
 
 
men” with fundamental constitutional rights, though the Court did not preclude 
that an overlap could occur in certain instances.  Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105–06; cf. 
Federal Remedy to Redress Private Deprivations of Civil Rights, supra, at 101–
02.  The tip-off that the Court intended no equation of the two types of rights is 
that there are two separate rationales for the Griffin holding, each predicated 
on a different constitutional theory.  A theory grounded in the Thirteenth 
Amendment is that, because travelling interstate is basic to freedom, a Section 
2 statute protecting such activity is effectively regulating a badge and incident 
of slavery and, consequently, the statute must be a constitutional exercise of 
legislative power.  Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105.  The other theory is grounded on the 
existence of a fundamental federal constitutional right to travel interstate.  Id. 
at 105–06.  The Court explains that said right “is within the power of Congress 
to protect by appropriate legislation.”  Id. at 106.  The only reason to make this 
point, in the context of this case, was to provide another rationale for the 
outcome.  See Jones, supra note 305, at 716–17 (agreeing that the Court 
provided these two separate rationales, in the alternative, for the outcome in 
Griffin). 
 309. See White, supra note 307, at 192 n.164 (reporting that the Court, since 
Griffin, has not recognized other rights as freedom rights). 
 310. See supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 312. Swinney, supra note 81, at 36 (stating that the lash was the primary 
means of controlling slaves); For further descriptions of the flogging of slaves, 
see BLASSINGAME, supra note 81, at 251; DOUGLASS, supra note 81, at 52, 121; 4 
PAGE SMITH, THE NATION COMES OF AGE 585, 615–16 (1981); Aremona G. 
Bennett, Phantom Freedom: Official Acceptance of Violence to Personal Security 
and Subversion of Proprietary Rights and Ambitions Following Emancipation, 
1865–1910, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 439, 440 (1994). 
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But the whip was the common instrument of 
punishment—indeed, it was the emblem of the master’s 
authority.  Nearly every slaveholder used it, and few 
grown slaves escaped it entirely.  Defenders of the 
institution [of slavery] conceded that corporal punishment 
was essential in certain situations; some were convinced 
that it was better than any other remedy. 
* * * * 
Some overseers, upon assuming control, thought it wise to 
whip every hand on the plantation to let them know who 
was in command . . . .313
The history documents, without relief, that corporal 
punishment was an everyday ritual inflicted on southern 
slaves regardless of their age;
 
314 it was nothing less than 
southern standard operating procedure before the Civil War.  
The significance of this proposition is that, under Supreme 
Court precedents, it exposes and stamps today’s corporal 
punishment of children as a badge and incident of slavery.315  
And, of course, the import of the punishment as a badge and 
incident of slavery is that, under Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, Congress is empowered to enact a ban on the 
punishment.316
Incidentally, Congress can give teeth to such a ban, or to 
one enacted under the first theoretical construct, by including 
enforcement measures in it such as a private cause of action 
for damages or for an equitable remedy against the statute’s 
violators or by making them subject to criminal liability.
 
317
 
 313. KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE 
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 174, 177 (1984). 
  
Reinforcing a ban in this manner would not be a departure; 
rather, a ban with bite would be consistent with other 
 314. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC., 106TH CONG., 2D SESS., at E2106 (Nov. 14, 
2000) (averring that whipping slaves, including children, was omnipresent in 
the South); HURMENCE, supra note 87, at 9 (setting forth slave Fannie Moore’s 
recollection of a childhood beating dispensed by her master); KING, supra note 
87, at 20, 29, 215, 217 (recounting various episodes of slave masters whipping 
slave children); Burton, supra note 87, at 39, 46 (remarking upon slave masters’ 
standard practice of whipping slave children); Schermerhorn, supra note 87, at 
204, 208–09 (providing a slave child’s description of being flogged). 
 315. See supra notes 310–12 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
 317. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971); Azmy, supra note 252, 
at 1036. 
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legislation passed under Section 2.318
The analysis presented in this Part II should be 
dauntingly difficult to overcome; it arises, comfortably and 
conspicuously, from historical fact and from solid legal 
precedents going back almost half a century.  There is a 
counterargument, though, that makes a credible attempt.  It 
is the exhalation of an antebellum South engulfed in all kinds 
of physical violence among all kinds of people.
 
319  The gist of 
the critique is that, given the general mayhem, corporal 
punishment of slaves was just another symptom of the 
South’s unbridled violence, and that, in this context, the 
physical assaults comprising the punishment were not 
peculiar to the master-slave relationship.320  Historical 
investigation as per Jones, the logic goes, therefore cannot 
support categorizing corporal punishment of children in the 
twenty-first century as a badge and incident of slavery within 
Congress’ purview.321
Though superficially arresting, the rebuttal does not 
work upon closer inspection.  Perhaps the most blatant flaw 
is that what slaves suffered at their masters’ hands is on all 
fours with the accepted definition of corporal punishment of 
children while the run-of-the-mill physical violence in the 
antebellum South, outside of the master-slave relation, 
cannot be squared with that definition except by occasional 
happenstance.  It will be recalled that corporal punishment, 
as defined in this Article, is the use of physical force upon a 
child’s body with the intention of causing the child to 
experience bodily pain so as to correct or punish the child’s 
 
 
 318. See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for 
Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 71 n.284 (2004) 
(listing statutes which the Court has identified as predicated on Congress’ 
Section 2 powers under the Thirteenth Amendment, including some providing 
for civil causes of action or for criminal penalties). 
 319. BILL CECIL-FRONSMAN, COMMON WHITES: CLASS AND CULTURE IN 
ANTEBELLUM NORTH CAROLINA 170 (1992); BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, HONOR 
AND VIOLENCE IN THE OLD SOUTH 27, 36, 39, 104, 131, 140, 145–46, 150, 189 
(1986). 
 320. This counterargument comes from Professor Paul Finkelman, in 
response to my oral presentation of the outlines of the Section 2 thesis described 
hereinabove.  Paul Finkelman, President William McKinley Distinguished 
Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Co-Panelist, 14th Annual Conference of 
the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities (Mar. 11, 
2011). 
 321. Id. 
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behavior.322  Giving the counterargument the benefit of a 
doubt by assuming arguendo that some incidents of this 
regnant southern violence may have fulfilled the definition or 
a part thereof, the master’s corporal punishment of his slaves 
and corporal punishment of children always and necessarily 
fulfill every constitutive element of the definition.  That 
correspondence is established by Part I323 herein and is made 
a precondition to the analysis in Part II,324
But, juristic jousting is hard to stop once begun, 
especially upon discovering that one is comparatively well-
armed.  Momentarily putting to one side corporal punishment 
of slaves, the intense culture of violence in which the pre-war 
South wallowed was quite distinctive.
 and this Article’s 
demonstration of it throughout should be the 
counterargument’s quietus. 
325  A major factor 
shaping this ethos was a code of honor zealously embraced 
and sanctified by white southern men.326  The code embodied 
a preoccupation with upholding male and family honor that 
was tied to a sense of self and was dependent upon the 
respect of the community.327  For these men, the only way to 
ensure that community respect remained intact in the face of 
insult was through physical force; they had a proclivity if not 
a compulsion to fight, often in duels, over any threatened 
sullying of their honor.328  Clearly, physical violence 
instigated by a fierce commitment to honor has almost 
nothing in common, beyond the violence itself, with either 
legalized corporal punishment of yesterday’s slaves or of 
today’s children.329
 
 322. See BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 2–3. 
  The white southern men who were 
spurred to action by this mania wielded sword or pistol 
 323. See supra Part I.A. 
 324. See supra Part II.A. 
 325. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE MILITANT SOUTH, 1800–1861, at 2, 53, 62, 
131 (1984); see NICOLAS W. PROCTOR, BATHED IN BLOOD: HUNTING AND 
MASTERY IN THE OLD SOUTH 71 (2002); WYATT-BROWN, supra note 319, at 27, 
36, 39, 104, 131, 140, 145–46, 150, 189. 
 326. CECIL-FRONSMAN, supra note 319, at 171–72; FRANKLIN, supra note 
325, at 131; CHRISTOPHER J. OLSEN, POLITICAL CULTURE AND SECESSION IN 
MISSISSIPPI: MASCULINITY, HONOR, AND THE ANTIPARTY TRADITION, 1830–1860, 
at 11 (2000); PROCTOR, supra note 325, at 71; WYATT-BROWN, supra note 319, 
passim. 
 327. OLSEN, supra note 326, at 11; CECIL-FRONSMAN, supra note 319, at 171. 
 328. FRANKLIN, supra note 325, at 2, 53. 
 329. See id. 
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against each other with intent to prevent or eradicate a stain 
upon honor, not with an intent to correct or punish 
misconduct as required by the definition of corporal 
punishment of children. 
Perhaps most telling of all, it should be borne in mind 
that the Section 2 statutes, which have been upheld by the 
Court as within Congress’ power,330 regulated or proscribed as 
badges and incidents of slavery modern incarnations of 
practices that were not confined solely to the southern 
master-slave relationship.  These practices, it was previously 
mentioned, include racial discrimination in the sale or rental 
of property,331 curtailment or denial of interstate travel,332 
and abridgement of the right to enter into and enforce 
contracts.333  However, in describing the plight of white 
southern womanhood before the Civil War, one scholar 
contributes that “Scarlett O’Hara to the contrary, . . . [white] 
women in the antebellum South ‘took no part in 
governmental affairs, were without legal rights over their 
property or guardianship of their children, were denied 
adequate educational facilities, and were excluded from 
business and the professions.’ ” 334  And, “[i]t was not until the 
1850s that state legislatures began to reform the common law 
of marital status as it governed wives’ capacity to engage in 
legal transactions, and to modify the doctrine of marital 
service that gave husbands ownership of their wives’ 
earnings.”335
It has here been shown, and said probably overmuch, 
that the counterargument has no legs.  Earlier, and more 
crucially, this Article makes an analytically conservative and 
affirmative showing that Congress has the power under 
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to rationally classify 
corporal punishment of children either as a form of slavery 
itself or as a badge and incident of slavery, and, hence, to 
 
 
 330. See supra notes 296–98 and accompanying text. 
 331. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439–44 (1968). 
 332. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104–06 (1971). 
 333. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976). 
 334. LORRAINE DUSKY, STILL UNEQUAL: THE SHAMEFUL TRUTH ABOUT 
WOMEN AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 254–55 (1996) (quoting VIRGINIUS DABNEY, 
LIBERALISM IN THE SOUTH 361 (1932)). 
 335. Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims 
Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1083 
(1994). 
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enact a ban on the punishment.  Whether Congress should do 
so from a policy perspective is, naturally, a different question. 
B. Policy Reasons for Congress to Enact a Ban on Corporal 
Punishment of Children 
For purposes of crafting legal analysis, Part I of this 
Article provides a thorough exposition of the adverse effects 
and moral trespasses corporal punishment visits upon 
children.336
Recent scientific studies have decisively demonstrated 
that corporal punishment of children, regardless of its 
intensity, venue, or the particular identities of the people 
involved, puts children at serious risk in multiple ways.  If 
there was some worthwhile benefit achieved by corporally 
punishing children, perhaps compromising the entire 
population of spanked children in this manner could be 
justified, though the dividends would have to be colossal to 
withstand a cost-benefit analysis.  Even then, corporal 
punishment advocates would have a very, very hard sell.  The 
odds against their success can be best appreciated when one 
realizes that the proponent of spanking would be in the 
position of a physician who recommends that parents should 
give their children medicine which does no good to speak of, 
but which definitely could jeopardize the children.  No 
reasonable caregivers would agree to administer a single 
dose; rather, they would hasten to lock the “medicine” away 
with other poisons. 
  A very brief recapitulation of that information is 
set forth here in aid of the policy discussion. 
Allowing the massive cohort of American children to 
continue to be imperiled by negative serious outcomes is not 
befitting a society claiming to espouse family values and to 
celebrate its children.337  The unacceptability of the status 
quo is further compounded by the ethical objections to 
corporal punishment of children,338
 
 336. See supra Part I. 
 e.g., objections that the 
 337. See IRENE TAVISS THOMSON, CULTURE WARS AND ENDURING AMERICAN 
DILEMMAS 91 (2010) (pointing out that more than other nationalities, 
Americans consider the family as very important); cf. Muzaffar Chishti, A 
Redesigned Immigration Selection System, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 115, 122 
(2008) (referring to the “deeply-rooted American value” of emphasizing family). 
 338. For a full discussion of the moral concerns over corporal punishment of 
children, see BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 1–46. 
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punishment inflicts unnecessary somatic pain and is unfair in 
comparison to the protection adults have under criminal 
assault and battery laws.339  Though Americans have not 
been attuned to think of corporal punishment of children as 
an exigency calling for federal intervention, it may, in fact, be 
just that, if only we will see it.340
Yet, children’s salubrity is not the only reason for 
Congress to act.  Adult well-being hangs in the balance too.  
The adverse effects of childhood corporal punishment may 
last into and throughout the victim’s majority, ruining or 
impeding prospects for personal fulfillment.
  Indeed, the well-being, 
optimal development, and happiness of innumerable children 
are at stake, and that should be exigency enough. 
341  Adult 
punishers also may experience a sense of loss because the 
punishment is associated with deterioration of the parent-
child relationship342 and may provoke guilt feelings for having 
caused pain to a child they care about.343
 
 339. See supra notes 146–74 and accompanying text. 
  The toll exacted by 
 340. I single out Americans because a substantial part of the rest of the 
world has taken action against corporal punishment of children.  The global 
community has made corporal punishment of children a human rights violation.  
BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 47–151.  As of this 
writing, over one hundred countries have banned school corporal punishment, 
including thirty-three that have banned the punishment entirely.  Global Table, 
GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO END ALL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2012) http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/pages/frame.html 
(follow “Global progress,” then “Global table”). 
 341. Gershoff, supra note 128, at 547–48; see Lansford & Dodge, supra note 
41, at 265–67 (determining that more frequent use of childhood corporal 
punishment is related to higher prevalence of violence and approval of violence 
at a societal level); Corrine E. Leary et al., Parental Use of Physical Punishment 
as Related to Family Environment, Psychological Well-Being, and Personality in 
Undergraduates, 23 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 1, 5–6 (2008) (ascertaining that 
undergoing childhood physical discipline may be related to one’s family 
environment and psychological health in young adulthood); Murray A. Straus, 
The Special Issue on Prevention of Violence Ignores the Primordial Violence, 23 
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1314, 1314, 1316–18 (2008) (summarizing studies 
that show corporal punishment of children may lead to other interpersonal and 
societal physical violence); Jennifer Wareham et al., A Test of Social Learning 
and Intergenerational Transmission Among Batterers, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 163, 
169–71 (2009) (conveying that corporal punishment of children is linked to 
interpersonal violence in adulthood); see also ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN 
GOOD: HIDDEN CRUELTY IN CHILD-REARING AND THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE 61, 
65–66, 115–17, 172 (Hildegarde Hannum & Hunter Hannum trans., 1990) 
(theorizing that childhood corporal punishment may lead to more aggressive 
adults when such children grow up). 
 342. Gershoff, supra note 128, at 541–42. 
 343. BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at xvi; NANCY 
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childhood physical chastisement may therefore be a source of 
continuing individualized impairment and discontent among 
adults. 
It is common sense that all these impaired lives are 
bound to have a cumulative effect on society at large, even 
upon individuals who have never physically chastised a child 
or been physically chastised themselves during childhood.  
The punishment’s childhood outcomes that may continue into 
adulthood include increased aggressiveness, increased 
antisocial and criminal tendencies, and the exacerbation of 
emotional instability.344  Adults possessing any or a 
combination of these attributes have the psychological 
wherewithal to either engage in inhumane conduct or to turn 
an indifferent eye in that direction.345
We have never lived in an America populated by adults 
who were spared the rod during childhood.  We cannot know 
with certainty what that America would be like, but modern 
scientific findings overwhelmingly indicate that pitiless 
aggressiveness and antisocial cruelties should gradually 
become less frequent and perhaps imperceptibly fade from 
the scene.
  When masses of adults 
are so afflicted, they collectively resemble nothing so much as 
a tinderbox that may or may not combust, but that makes 
maintenance of social peace continually precarious. 
346  Martin Luther King, Jr. dared to dream of an 
irenic brotherhood without the input of science.347
 
SAMALIN WITH MARTHA MORAGHAN JABLOW, LOVING YOUR CHILD IS NOT 
ENOUGH: POSITIVE DISCIPLINE THAT WORKS 73 (1987). 
  Are we 
 344. See Gershoff, supra note 128, at 541–42. 
 345. BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 24–28; GREVEN, 
supra note 29, at 199, 201–04, 206–07; MILLER, supra note 341, at 62, 66–75, 
79–84, 86–91, 115, 139–97, 242–43, 264–65; BENJAMIN SPOCK, DR. SPOCK ON 
PARENTING: SENSIBLE ADVICE FROM AMERICA’S MOST TRUSTED CHILD-CARE 
EXPERT 151–52 (1988); Herman, supra note 276, at 36–39. 
 346. See supra notes 135, 214–16 and accompanying text.  
 347. The Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.’s famous “I have a Dream” 
speech includes the following: 
I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia, sons of former 
slaves and sons of former slave-owners will be able to sit down at the 
table of brotherhood. 
. . . .  
I have a dream that one day, down in Alabama, . . . little black boys 
and black girls will be able to join hands with little white boys and 
white girls as sisters and brothers. 
. . . .  
. . . This is the faith that I go back to the South with. . . . With this faith 
we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a 
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perhaps not lesser citizens to ignore such dreams when 
science has our backs? 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has advanced the proposition that 
proscribing all corporal punishment of children may help to 
put a wearied human race on the high road toward a more 
anodyne and secure life.  Not that utopia is around the 
corner; there are no final destinations in the quest to be more 
civilized and humane. 
The Article also bears a subtextual leitmotiv that is a 
corollary of prohibiting such punishment—a corollary of 
epochal proportions.  The prohibition, in making bodily 
integrity sacrosanct, would necessarily and instantly elevate 
children to full-fledged personhood, much like the slaves 
before them.  It would constitute a genuine watershed in the 
history of American childhood and in the progressive 
recognition of human dignity. 
It is almost too good to be true that of all the 
Constitution, the Thirteenth Amendment virtually beckons 
us down this path.  Men in deepest sympathy with the 
abolitionist cause authored the Amendment.348  The 
abolitionists themselves, scandalized by physical coercion, 
among other indignities, crusaded to abolish slavery;349 for 
the same reason, they struggled against corporal punishment 
of children.350
 
  How splendid and providential, then, that 
standard constitutional analysis enables the Amendment to 
finally fulfill the abolitionist’s lesser-known mission. 
 
beautiful symphony of brotherhood. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, in I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND 
SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 101, 104–05 (James Melvin Washington 
ed., 1992). 
 348. See supra text accompanying note 189. 
 349. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 350. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text. 
